In defense of political ecology : a moral conception of ecological obligation. by Weinstein, Stanley J.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1985
In defense of political ecology : a moral conception
of ecological obligation.
Stanley J. Weinstein
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weinstein, Stanley J., "In defense of political ecology : a moral conception of ecological obligation." (1985). Doctoral Dissertations 1896
- February 2014. 1863.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1863

IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL ECOLOGY:
A MORAL CONCEPTION OF ECOLOGICAL OBLIGATION
A Dissertation Presented
By
STANLEY JEROME WEINSTEIN
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 1985
Department of Political Science
Stanley Jerome Weinstein
All Rights Reserved
IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL ECOLOGY:
A MORAL CONCEPTION OF ECOLOGICAL OBLIGATION
A Dissertation Presented
By
STANLEY J. WEINSTEIN
Approved as to style and content by;
Jerome B. King, Chairperson i
/'
^egm. EI shta^rnr Member
Arthur Westing, Member
Glen Gordon, Chairman
Department of Political Science
iii
To the memory of George Lichtheim,
fellow traveller.
The prophetic individual does not
possess the future, he merely intimates
it. He cannot assert it, yet he is lost
to the actuality to which he belongs.
S<6ren Kierkegaard
The Concept of Irony
iv
ABSTRACT
In Defense of Political Ecology:
A Moral Conception of Ecological Obligation
(May 1985)
Stanley Jerome Weinstein
B.A. American University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jerome King
The suppressed thesis of this work is that environ-
mental and natural resource policies in the advanced indus-
trial countries, and especially in the United States, can
not work to bring about the stated goals of legislative
policies such as the National Environmental Protection Act
or the Endangered Species Act because the clearest and
strongest tenets of these legislative ideas are in funda-
mental conflict with the self-description of most modern
people and their self -reflection in their shaping of
institutions
.
The more concretely stated thesis is based on a
model of the contemporary industrial person as having shed
older identities and having taken on a self-created nature,
one that owes nothing to the natural world but owes every-
V
thing to the created environment. The thesis, then, is
that a new human type has made the concept of environmen-
talism impossible to realize.
Cracks in the modern collective ego of industrial
societies suggest that a counter current could conceivably
cause a sense of deep uncertainty about our self -definition
.
The environmentalist qua preservationist might possibly
succeed in articulating a "reason" why we should stop de-
stroying wild nature, and that we should attempt to
communicate this reason to other nations. Thus far the
preservationists have failed to state the reason that
motivates their own behavior. The remainder of this work
is devoted to articulating the needed reason, the philo-
sophical and political coherence of this rationality.
The sense of this idea is that we owe duties not to others
first, but to ourselves. Yet "self" is the very problematic
notion we started with. Our very self -definition , which
shapes our notions of ethics, distorts the old under-
standing of duties to ourselves.
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INTRODUCTION
In the abstract for this dissertation it is stated
that preservationists have not been able to offer a reason
for their behavior stemming from their desire to save wild
nature from the onslaught of modern thinking and action.
This statement is open to misinterpretation because in a
very concrete way the preservationists have indeed stated
their views, and hence have said why they will and do act.
By a "reason" I mean, however, far more than a rationale
for action. Anyone can put forth a viewpoint and act
according to it, but in some cases a terrible price may be
exacted for doing so. Social behavior has to fit within
some spectrum of ideas. A reason for action, then, must
conform to an accepted notion of rationality, that is, a
social discourse which allows a set of behaviors. To give
a reason why the majority of society should cease to act
in a certain way with respect to a certain range of meanings
is all the more problematic. To gain legitimacy, to gain
entry into the realm of accepted discourse is difficult
enough, to attempt to cancel discourse accepted as legiti-
mate requires what some philosophers call, perhaps too
vaguely, a paradigm revolution.
1
2The major thrust of this work is to map out the
route to the revision of rationality and its actions.
Of course, current practice is to weigh wildlife and other
nonhuman life on an economic scale. Preservationists,
perhaps unknowingly, act as if to suggest a form of
rational behavior fundamentally at odds with the industrial
mind. Yet no preservationist has ever suggested the absur-
dity of a retreat to an earlier social epoch. Bits and
pieces of a notion evoking a sustainable society have been
discussed, although no one has theorized about the nature
of the self that would be requisite for such a society.
A new discourse does not gain admission from outside
the social consciousness, but is constructed from the ruins
of old ideas, from the tension within a society. Although
environmental politics is well-known in the form of "Green"
parties, eco-f eminists , and lobbyists for the preservation
of wild species, the rational grounds for these views are
poorly understood. In order to spell out the nature of a
political ecology it is necessary to construct its foundation
and "deconstruct" the bases for the ideas that put in motion
the forces indifferent to the earth.
This work is conceptual rather than historical.
Numerous works have already traced the historical roots of
our environmental problems. The project of a social theory
to displace the tradition from Hobbes to Adam Smith and to
3Max Weber must take a new turn, the ecological turn. The
move proceeds from reflections on contemporary events to a
reflection on the nature of the self brought into being by
a process which for now can be called "abstraction."
The procedure leads us to consider the core meaning
of environmentalism and the social idea behind it. The
problem, sharpened in chapter two, leads to the conclusion
that moral and political terms taken together are the only
ones useful toward a definition of ecological society. We
realize that the ecological turn means a revision of the fu-
ture as set out for us by Hobbes, Smith, and Weber. Similar-
ly a reconsideration of morality in a political context can
only be discussed if there is a new basis for thinking of
human life directed toward ends that serve a life-regarding
sensibility. If, as the tradition has it, the point of
social life is analogous to a closed loop, then the fate of
the earth, almost certainly, is to die slowly. At the same
time, the fate of a certain human image will be to give way
to a cynical creature bent on self-absorption, power, and
destruction, images from the tradition.
CHAPTER I
HOMOCENTRISM VERSUS ECOCENTRISM
The Problem of Environmentalism
Perhaps the most urgent question confronting modern
man/woman is what kind of world they want to have. By
"world" we mean the physical landscape and the human kind
that will inhabit it. The present course is to multiply
and grow. Soon our landscape will be a jungle of develop-
ment and all wilderness will disappear. There are many
environmentalists who mourn each loss of wilderness and see
in each passing the possibility that a certain human kind
will fade away
.
Social theorists, philosophers, and other students
of the life of the mind and society have tended to treat
their question-problems as if human life existed in our built
spaces and nowhere else. Indeed, they have tended to treat
human life as if it were the only life and the only signifi-
cant entity on earth. Both our intellectual and social life
encourage the assumption that humanity is self-sufficient.
Our questions about the status and nature of morality, the
ultimate basis for knowledge of the objective world, and
4
5the nature of a social science all assume that our humanity
has remained unchanged through the ages and that our human-
ity is the only subject of concern to theorists of mind
and society.
About our humanity, we moderns have come to suppose
that minds are the locus of our being. When we do consider
our bodies, we tend to suppose them to be largely abstracted
from a place, a supposition further encouraged by our forays
into outer space. Thus, the world we represent to ourselves
brings to mind a mental space more than it does a lived
environment. Our disembodied minds allow us to think of
ourselves in terms of our own rationality. We are in this
manner locked into thinking about ourselves as rational
egos, precluding an idea of humanity as bound up with tra-
ditions and customs distinctly tied to a particular place
and its land. Modernity, of course, has been treated as
a theme from countless perspectives. It presents the most
difficulty, however, to the quest for a social science, an
understanding of the social in these terms. There is but
one reason to raise this issue. The quest for a social
science has never been couched in terms of the modern
human type standing in sharp contrast to the antiquated
human types of various traditions. Max Weber gave us the
categories in which we think of modern bureaucratic society
and the humanity it embodies; but we have little under-
6standing of the deep contrast by which we may further
understand the modern self. Furthermore, Claude Levi-
Strauss gave us insights into the nature of the primitive
mind, but we have no method by which to grasp the problem
of modern humanity as a shift in consciousness from an
"inhabitant" to a socially constructed being.
The project here is to present both the rudiments
of a method and an inquiry into the nature of humanity
devoid of being, that is, a human created by the social
fabric and not conscious of any debt to the natural world.
Because a great many people have voiced serious doubts
about the vast, ongoing destruction of wildlife, forests,
antarctic ecosystems, and ocean life including the great
mammals and birds, it becomes apparent that a segment of
humanity experiences the extinction of wild nature as a
loss. Hence, this inquiry could focus on the question
"what is environmentalism?" but the reader would be apt to
miss the deeper problem persisting beneath the flotsam of
questions about the destruction of the environment. The
clue that there is a deeper problem is easy to discover.
Policy makers are mirrors of the social mind, the prevail-
ing rationality. Environmental and natural resource policy
are based on the ideas we hold about the "workability"
of a modern (post) industrial social system. Given the
ideas moderns have of themselves and their social world,
7it is not surprising that the nonhuman world finds no
place in the self-understanding of modern people. And,
if nonhumanity has no place in our psyches, then it belongs
to the world of commodities. The logic of all this would
be tight and well accepted, except that it is not; at least
it is not completely accepted. That a battle rages with
the point of having this logic internalized by all is not
arguable. What is of interest is the rebellion itself,
the rebellion against being disinherited from a form of
humanity, from a form of thought and action that is being
swept away by a virulent strain of humanity.
The upshot, the sense of this inquiry, is to under-
stand, interpret the nature of this sensibility that
refuses to go quietly into the good night. What is the
quiddity of this version of humanity? What kind of world
would be manifest if such people were dominant? What forms
would rationality take? To answer these queries, the
method of interrogation from the hypothetical standpoint
of what may be called "ecocentri sm" is required. The
standpoint itself is fairly well understood in the philo-
sophical literature on ecological understanding; the social
theory, the politics, its thought and action are much less
well understood. Feminist ecology has been developed along
the lines of a nonexploi tive world view espousing philo-
sophical holism.'*' But something more than a set of
8principles is required to grasp the problems we moderns face,
and the kind of alternative that would both manage problems
of scarcity, resolve problems of artificial scarcity, and
create more humane and equitable conditions for a less
populated world. Rather than propound a set of a priori
principles for ameliorating the human condition (the worst
kind of theorizing), the point here is to understand the
ecocentric self and the moral science it entails.
More superficially, it has been thought that
environmentalists seek a clean, beautiful, and spacious
world to ultimately benefit themselves. It is charged that
the kind of world they want is one molded in their own
image, while other people want a different world, one that
is highly developed and taps every existing resource. The
proponents of social wealth view instrumentally the earth
and what it contains. They see features of the nonhuman
world as a means to an end, the end being social wealth.
The world molded in the image of these "possessive individ-
uals" is a strange image, for it does not have a human face
but only of the things they possess.
Instrumentalists, as we will call the proponents
of social wealth, reply that the end which they seek is
not really social wealth but rather the kind of pleasure
and happiness derived from material goods. What their
spokespersons say is that they hold to certain ideas of
9the good, namely human well-being
, which is grounded in the
premise that human well-being is intrinsically good. Of
course, the idea of what constitutes "well-being," v>;hat
kind of a world would be required for human well-being,
is open to widely diverse interpretations.
The contemporary conflict between environmentalists
and such instrumentalists seems, then, to reflect a debate
between two view of the good life or what has come to be
called "the quality of life" schism. As such, there is
little to consider in this extreme relativism. Yet this
is where the question of environmentalism has been left,
as a conflict between opposing wants and desires. It should
be understood from the opening statements and questions that
this notion of environmentalism is bogus and also absurd.
The explanation follows.
Environmentalists point out that value is a slippery
term, for the instrumentalists ascribe value only to human
states of mind and not to intrinsic qualities of being
discerned in nonhuman entities. Environmentalists further
point out that value in the hands of the instrumentalists
is always human value in that they see no value inherent
in any other life form. The term commonly applied to this
phenomenon is "anthropocentrism , " a term that on reflection
is profoundly unsatisfactory. For a term reflecting a
polar meaning opposite to anthropocentrism we will need to
10
do some searching. The fact is that a ready opposite to
anthropocentrism is not available.
Before we look for a term of contrasting meaning,
we should try to better understand the term. First note
that the term is wrongly applied to instrumentalists alone.
Consider that many people value human states of mind or
qualities of other people or the possession of knowledge
as having intrinsic worth, but at the same time do not see
intrinsic value in any nonhuman features of the world.
Many people see value as having meaning only when applied
to human attributes; they are not instrumentalists but
anthropocentrists
. Our term suggests to us that human
language is about the human world, about the world humans
have made for themselves; we value that which we have made
or that by which things are produced. Anthropocentrism
further suggests that it is only within a human context,
a world which has been built up and evolved, that humans
see things as having worth. Suppose, for example,-
Australopithecus were valuing animals. The world they saw
was undifferentiated; there was no human world. Value to
them was simple instrumentality. As language evolved into
something which is about "our world," we learned the habit
of saying that which is "good" or has value in itself is
distinguishable from nonhuman things. Language locks
people into a human world. Anthropocentrism in some
11
respect is unavoidable because a world of value is built
up by language. Only if we can jump over our shadow and
somehow posit value in the nonhuman world can we escape all
aspects of anthropocentrism. Since we cannot do this com-
pletely, we are all, to some extent, anthropocentris ts
.
If we are to understand the core of environmentalism which
is non-anthropocentric, we must eschew the language of
value altogether, and move on to what may be a deeper
analysi s
.
At this point we are searching for terminology
with which to frame the problem of environmentalism. We
must reach new terminology genuinely; we cannot shed the
old simply by fiat, so for the moment we are stuck with
our original terms. Let us return to our analysis of the
problem
.
Environmentalists want to preserve the planet Earth
and all of its nonhuman inhabitants. Instrumentalists may
also want to preserve nonhuman life, but only because much
nonhuman life directly or indirectly benefits humans.
Nonetheless, it appears there are two kinds of environmen-
talists, so the term is unclear. What is clear is that
there is widespread agreement about how humans are de-
stroying much of the nonhuman life on earth and by so
doing possibly creating conditions which threaten human
viability in the future.
L2
Given this agreement, very many people have recog-
nized the need for a morality adequate to the concept of
ecological obligation, since anthropocentric morality is
not much of a basis for the consideration of nonhuman life.
Still, instrumentalists argue that we need consider only
what is good for humans
,
and that it is perfectly possible
to arrange the world accordingly. Some environmentalists
take the opposite view, that it is not possible to consider
human wants alone and also maintain conditions on earth
which ensure human life in the future. However, the
meaning of environmental preservation lies not in this
scientific and practical prediction, but rather in a view
about the nature of the self in society.
As this work unfolds, a social critique will be
elaborated which deals with the question of how modern
industrial society can be understood in a new and illumi-
nating way. The question of a social critique from within
and the grounds for such a critique will also concern us.
These general statements about the nature of the
problem give us an understanding of the social theoretical
meaning of the present project, but not much more than
this. In a deep way the problem defies simple statement.
We might be content to say that this work addresses the
question: what is environmentalism? This question is
unsatisfactory because almost nothing in any of the
13
relevant literature suggests the concepts which, it will
be argued, are needed to answer a question that is widely
believed to be straightforward. Arguments about the nature
of selfhood rarely mention in the same connection the
question about the meaning of wild nature. This connection
will be drawn in detail. Among the several sub-theses
involved in the present argument, one is crucial. It is
that the question: why ought one be ecologically obli-
gated? is unintelligible because the subject, the "one"
who is to be so obligated, is opaque, obscure, and a
mystery to ourselves.
We moderns may ask why it is so important or urgent
to question, as many environmentalists do, the foundations
of our old traditions and habits in dealing with nature.
Interrogations of the environmentalist's quest to save wild
nature from the technocratic rationale for development and
commerce might bring questions like the relation of every-
man ' s/everywoman
' s happiness to the destruction of wildlife
or its habitat. What does a little destruction matter in
the long run? It is possible to reply that the state of
the nonhuman world mirrors the human condition. Yet if
the human condition is such that moderns do not see any
problem, then who can say that any problem exists? This is
precisely the dilemma of certain environmentalists. If
they are critical of industrial people for their wanton
14
disregard of nonhuman life, they are apt to be looked upon
as somehow absurd. Yet, if they remain silent they default
on any possibility of reversing the destruction.
Are we anthropocentric?
Anthropocentrism is a useful term in some contexts,
but we do not believe it to be a satisfactory term to
describe the condition of modern industrial peoples. In
many historical contexts value has been ascribed to the
nonhuman world only in so far as aspects of the nonhuman
world benefit humans, and not because of any intrinsically
valuable qualities. A human-centered approach to the world
is not strikingly new. The medieval Europeans were anthro-
pocentric and so were the ancient Greeks. It has been
shown by a number of scholars that ancients often destroyed
aspects of their environment in order to secure needed
2
resources. Timber, for example, became a major resource
3in the middle ages. Indeed, the Romans and others before
4them were clear-cutting forests. A great deal of wild-
life habitat was destroyed in early times. Animals were
directly destroyed for their fur and meat. These are
anthropocentric attitudes and they have been with us for
ages . The question remains whether the subject involved
in these attacks on wild nature was the same, the identical
subject or actor, who inhabits the modern world.
15
When we said we must search for a term of contrast
to "anthropocentrism," we were suggesting an ambiguity.
For anthropocentrism can be seen as a narrow and selfish
attitude on the part of humans in that only they count for
something of value. Or it can mean that, unlike the forces
of the anti-rational and demonic, there is a rational world
of value having at its center a moral agency from which
this value emanates. The semantics of anthropocentrism
falls into into this gestalt. The terminology we want
must escape this fatal ambiguity. That is, we must recog-
nize that one possible term of contrast to anthropocentrism
or human-centered is "allocentrism" or other-centered, and
by extension we may mean "holocentric" or world-centered.
Let us see whether we gain anything by this move. Now we
do gain something by contrasting "allocentric" or "holo-
centric" to "egocentric"; we move from self as the center
to world as the center. We gain a generalized all-inclu-
siveness. We have no difficulty understanding the gain
made my moving from narrow selfishness to a wider humani-
tarianism. But anthropocentrism can encompass both of
these terms. We can surely see that a world-centered
orientation can be human-centered in the broadest sense,
if we are speaking of language and value. Because world-
centered is suggestive of a world of value, we tend to
stay within the anthropocentric orbit.
16
The ambiguity of anthropocentrism is instructive.
Many an environmental writer has charged that modern people
are anthropocentric
.
Yet, unless there is an attractive
alternative we may have to accept that such people are
(ambiguously) a center of value. The two contrasting terms
suggested do not change matters. Homocentrism , a complex
term we will be developing, is not the kind of opposite
that can be described as "attractive," and allocentric is
not clearly an opposite since it can be seen to reinforce
the very ambiguity we want to escape. The argument we
will make comes down to this. We are stuck with apparent
anthropocentric language and consciousness during most of
our waking lives unless we can change to a new mode of
consciousness that can readily be described. VJhat might
cause the change to a new mode of consciousness is deeply
problematic. We may interrogate the discourses which con-
stitute the modern consciousness in order to bring into
view the nature of the modern self. To give it a name
and to distinguish it from traditional anthropocentrism
perhaps the designation "homocentrism" will do. Using
this terminology obliges us to find a convenient designa-
tion for the consciousness against which it stands. The
term "ecocentrist " has often been used in the environmental
literature, and so it will be adopted here.
17
How can it be demonstrated that human-value-
centeredness no longer exists in the modern world? The
anthropocentrist, whom we moderns mythologize as the very
essence of our meaning, eludes capture in the substantial
present, in our quotidian dealings. The highly ration-
alized existence of industrial countries filters out of
consciousness the ingredients of the traditional human
face, one inimical to the historical understandings of
anthropos. The centrism to which we attach the concept
of our being no longer belongs to anthropos
, but to a
human cipher inheriting the place occupied by the tradi-
tional language users. The self as occupier and defender
of meanings has transformed its constitutional nature as
self-interpreter. Created meanings break apart (figurative-
ly) in the contructed avenues of awareness manifest in much
of our built space. Our constructed consciousness leaves
us imprisoned in a set of rationalized structures of
meaning and action. We are the products of our own creation
The argument is that we are not human-centered in
any conventional understanding of this phrase. Rather,
traditional anthropocentri sm was the basis for moral
ideas not in principle hostile to nonhuman life. Thus the
contemporary arguments which purport to explain our eager
destruction of wild nature on the grounds that we are
"anthropocentric" fail. Ridding ourselves of the notion
18
that we are dealing with simple anthropocentrism will help
us to draw out the far reaching moral implication of a
homocentric narrowing of consciousness.
Spokespersons for our modern type might reply that
we are attempting to create an issue where none exists,
arguing that a human-centered attitude is the province of
man/woman as a user of language and within this province
there will always be narrow-minded people as well as
humanitarians; this, they might say, is the human condition
and to make more of a case than this is to intellectualize
about plain facts that have been apparent for millennia.
This is tempting bait, and if we take it the environmen-
talist's case collapses. The bait is to get us to agree
that environmentalism is but one more attitude among many,
neither more right nor necessarily more agreeable than
many others. Still, we will press our case. For the pur-
pose of doing so is to penetrate the surface of everyday
life and to revise the terms of discourse in which to
examine the premise of modern consciousness. Without this
there can be no theory of the revision of conscious-move
ness
In our search for terminology we moved from instru-
mentalism to homocentrism because we wanted to get beyond
the language of value, and, more generally, beyond the
ordinary ideas about the world espoused by industrial man
19
and woman. An interrogator must not fall into the familiar
meanings that serve the guardians of the City, linguistic
conventions by which we moderns steer a known course. The
interrogator can transcend these barriers to enlightenment
by breaking our ties to the conventions of rationality
that link us to the persona of homocentrism
.
The interrogator begins, then, with the under-
standing of why we are impelled to this work of moral
dissection. It involves the interrogator in an interpre-
tive estimate of modern social understanding in relation
to ideas apparently antithetical to our rational conventions.
Of course, the sense of this is to dissect our own self-
understanding about our project as it serves to legitimate
our existence. As we unravel this self, we bring into
question the foundation of its existence and hence the
legitimacy of the project.
More concretely, the emergence of environmentalism
has interrupted the complacent assumptions that technical-
economic rationality serve our wants and needs without any
side-effects that may ultimately cause a breakdown of these
very processes. The history of environmentalism can be
characterized as having taken a dual path. On the one
side, environmental thinking has thoroughly blended with
economic rationality. Pollution taxes, economic incen-
tives, charges, and a whole economic vocabulary has sprung
20
up. On the other side is a quite different environmental-
ism, one antithetical to this rational mode of conscious-
ness. Although every force in the spectrum of interests
has tried to bend this latter approach to reality to its
own approach, these attempts have failed. In the present,
these same forces are attempting to discredit this environ-
mentalism as aberrant thinking, as irrationalism
. It is
this mode of consciousness that we are impelled to interro-
gate. The aim is to understand whether the view of the
world to be examined is a viable political alternative to
the destructive practices of the present. To do this is to
grasp fully both modes of consciousness.
Homocentric consciousness
It is important to avoid the tiresome descriptions
of environmental destruction and tirades against the greed,
willfulness, or egoism that have long characterized indus-
trial attitudes toward the "human" environment and toward
wild nature. The interrogation is a concern to dissect
this consciousness. A central idea for anthropos
,
becoming
and the concept of the moral, is the basis for the human
model, anthropos
,
which is also the standpoint of the
interrogator
.
The phenomenon of moral neutralization has been
noted again and again in different guises, for example as
secularization and the modernization of consciousness.
The idea that modernity itself is responsible for the alter
ations of consciousness is, in an important way, fallacious
The built environment of modern peoples is not in itself
responsible for the problem of disrelational being. Rather
it was a condition for the problem that grew into a trans-
formation of the individual qua subject to the individual
qua object. By progressively internalizing the "goals"
of society that are set for it by the corporate techno-
structure, the individual gave up the autonomy that defined
the senses in which individualism was a viable idea.
We have now two strands to work with, the concept
of moral neutralization and the metamorphosis of selfhood.
The idea is that, in the eyes of anti-anthr5pos
, existence
reinterpreted means existence in terms of the built world
of social role players. This version of selfhood carries
implications for the moral life of the individual. It
bears on the relation of the self as agent to the sub-
stantial premise of morality. Insight can be gained into
the nature of the modern self in terms of the context in
which (s)he operates, namely, the context of economic
rationality. For there is no abstract actor-agent, but
only the socially determinate context for action which
gives rise to our interpretations of self and others.
22
The determinate context is a wholly rationalized one.
One cultural element after another has been absorbedinto the ever-widening economy, subjected to the
test of economic rationality, rationalized and
turned into a commodity or factor of production.
So pervasive has this process been that it now seems
that anything can be thought of as utilities.
. . .
.
. .
The elements that become commodities during
economic progress include time, land, capital, labor;
also personality itself, as well as all the artifacts
produced by man: art objects, ideas, experiences,
enjoyment itself, and even social relations.^
The point is not to "moralize" about moral neu-
tralization. The substantial literature treating this
formation of a social entity functioning as a member of
the "work force," as having a place in the economy, and as
therefore a feature of existence, not a maker of it, has
become a well-worn genre. The reader may thereby fail to
make a connection between this all too well accepted idea
of moral neutralization and the problem of the social
theorist's debate over facts versus values. Moral neu-
tralization entails that values have no locus in a subject
and are therefore nothing but variations of individual
characteristics. The subject turned into the subjective
individual is a description of the last stages in the
development toward homocentri sm
.
To conclude this section, a crucial item must be
mentioned in order to set the direction for the remainder
of this chapter and the dissertation as a whole. The
abstract expression "bedrock of being" is to be used here
23
as a sign post for the concept of the foundation for
inthropos, a human type that we will be at pains to model
as a basis for critique of homocentrism
.
The foundation for anthropos, then, is the basis
for the interrogation. A basis for action can be understood
in terms of the self's nature rather than as stemming from
a set of abstract precepts or rules. The laying bare of
the self's nature (its deconstruct ion ) will show a differ-
ence of sense, of nature, and hence a difference for action
and thought between anthr5pos and this modern "homocentric"
self.
Explaining the bifurcation
The next step is to explain the self's metamorphosis
from anthropos in all of its original diversity to homos
in all of its sameness. The phenomenon of the homocentric
self is inseparable from the built world in which it lives,
although it does not account for its nature. The dissection
of homocentric consciousness can be accomplished only after
the reader understands the psychic distance, and not rather
the intellectual-historical distance, that separates con-
temporary social reality from the very different construct
of both anthropos and the contemporary ecocentrist.
In a recent volume on social theory there appears
an innocent statement that, perhaps unwittingly, captures
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the concept of the bifurcation. The writer, paraphrasing
Emil Durkheim, tells us "...that man can escape nature not
merely by controlling it but also by creating another world
where he himself is at home and secure; this 'world' is
society."^ Here we have an idea about the world which
pays no attention to its animal origins; the world avail-
able to consciousness is human and created by us. Con-
sciousness knows the other world as mere "thinghood."
We will note that we are not speaking about a human-
centered world in which humans take primacy, but a world
from which nonhumans have been eliminated as subjects and
are now largely being eliminated as physical beings. If
one wishes to put it in a certain way, the category of
wild nature is being erased, an observation that some
writers have already made, as we see in this remark:
•
• • the concrete character of the social life of
the so-called advanced countries today . . . offer[s]
the spectacle of a world from which nature as such
has been eliminated, a world saturated with messages
and information, whose intricate commodity network
may be seen as the very prototype of a system of
signs. There is therefore a profound consonance
between linguistics as a method and that systematized^
and disembodied mightmare which is our culture today.
There is a deep connection between the last two
statements. A world saturated with formal messages is a
world already cut off from what is not human. The intri-
cate commodity network orients people to a built environ-
ment of fabricated things and noise. What we call
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an
"civilization," the re-invention of the world to suit
evolving need, is an accomplishment which has brought with
it the hubris that man himself is another kind of god.
From this collective elation, it follows that the animals
of the forest are taken to belong to the realm of thing-
hood. Through this civilizing process humans invented the
subject.
We mean by "subject" what could be meant by "per-
son," the notion that personhood is some special category
of life fully apart from other living forms. We do not
personify the bear or the otter. The "subject" is our
invention which we jealously guard. Yet it is an inven-
tion; the person did not come into being with the advent
of the human. The concept of "person" has had a complex
history. Language too has evolved as a part of the civi-
lizing process. We have brought into being the realms of
subject and object. Let us treat our problem of the human
world as if all humans have always been treated as subjects
and not as belonging to the category of "it." If we do
not, we confuse the issue in the way that advocates of
animal rights have done.
Civilization in one sense has meant comfort and
rest from the brutality of living undefended from the
elements. How interesting that from the simple need for
protection and comfort we come to invent the subject.
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We are perhaps too confident that the civilizing process
continues to refine our concept of the subject, creating
an ever greater distance between ourselves and "nature."
Instead, we may now see that we have brought ourselves
out beyond any world in which there is a basis in language
for any subject. What have we done? The intricate
commodity network makes no distinction between people
and things. The private individual as consumer of things
is but a part of the commodity network. The subject has
disappeared into this new scheme of things. We cannot
see why this should be so until we look more closely at
how the subject came to be. In the next chapter an exami-
nation of the concept of the relational self will give us
this understanding. For now, let us say that the subject
has come and gone.
We must explain, however, that the bifurcation in
consciousness is distinguished from a simple dichotomy
between what is human and what is nature. In some non-
western societies, aspects of the nonhuman world are given
the status of subjects in various ritual ways. Nonhumans
often take on symbolic significance. For example,
" ... in Phraan Muan Village the dog is treated as a
'degraded human'." Beliefs may be as diverse as societies,
but we can find a certain consistency in many nonwestern
societies in the way animals are given symbolic significance
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as subjects. The point here is that in ™ost societies a
dichotomy exists between human and nonhuman forms; for
example, taboos exist about eating human flesh, but few
exist about eating animals. This, of course, includes
most societies. Yet, we mean by a bifurcation in con-
sciousness the "cutting" out from consciousness of any
awareness of nature as a realm of beings. Nature as a
realm of things is looked upon as an object world. The
fact that a significant part of the living world has
become an object does not give us a clear view of the
human's own status.
Here is a peculiar situation, for the human world
does not remain a world of subjects standing in contrast
to a world of objects. The concept of the bifurcation is
not static. The object language for nonhuman elements in
the world gradually becomes relevant to a situation in
the human world of society. If the world of society is
a commodity network, then what kind of human does this
world reflect? There is only one clear answer to this
question: a human who uses an object language to express
the world, one which is now undifferentiated. The object
world is everywhere. As the human world has become a
world of commodities or things, the progression looks
1 ike thi s .
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The homocentric model
Object
Nature
Nature
Object
Human
This conceptualized history of consciousness
shows a phase in which the human subject emerged from
a long period of dwelling with nature in a relation
grounded in being. Although there were, of course,
many human societies and traditions, the abstraction
draws on certain universal characteristics. To articulate
these characteristics is part of the purpose of this
chapter. Drawing a distinction between kinds of con-
sciousness is the main effort. The initial split
between "object-nature" and "subject-human" should be
understood in terms of the present argument. We homo-
centrists still believe, in spite of all evidence to the
contrary, that we are identifiable as "subject-humans,"
as in the Kantian ethic in which a person stood in con-
formity to a moral order.
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The diagram shows a progression from consciousness
grounded in being to a point at which consciousness splits
off from nature. This subject-object dualism finally ter-
minates in an objectifying consciousness of human and
nature objects, the stage of homocentrism
. At this stage
the bifurcation is complete and cannot logically progress
any further.
The full intelligibility of the thesis can only
emerge from an understanding of the bifurcation and its
concrete sense in everyday discourse. Interrogating this
discourse in terms of its object language brings out its
contradictoriness
.
Here are a couple of examples that show the homo-
centrist in the guise of the environmentalist using the
object language. The homocentrist as oil importer seeks
to import oil cheaply and to make a profit. Oil spills
commonly affect sea life and at times people. The effect
of a spill, for the oil importer, is not the death of a
thousand sea birds, and possibly not the cost in social
terms, but rather the expense and inconvenience of causing
a so-called disamenity. For homocentric environmentalists,
the disamenity of a beach awash in oil makes it a much
less pleasant place to visit. Perhaps their aesthetic
value sense is offended. Perhaps they will appeal to an
argument about health, urging that the ocean environment
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ought to be better protected for such reasons; clean oceans
provide healthier environments, and beaches which do not
need to be cleaned up are cheaper to maintain.
The whole idea, we will notice, of an "environment"
becomes hopelessly entangled with the commodity network.
An amenity is but one benefit among others; a cost is
balanced by benefits, or so it is claimed.
The American Farmland Trust tell us that "America
is losing its farmland at an alarming rate."^ The Trust
goes on to tell us that:
.
. .
The acreage that provides the best farmland
is also prime land for developers to build on. As our
population grows and more and more people move away
from big cities, the demand for this land becomes
greated and greater
. . . and as the demand increases,
so too does the land value and the farmer's taxes . .
.
and as agricultural productivity becomes more and more
limited because of high energy costs and depleted soil
and water resources, the farmer today feels more and
more pressured to give in to the developers. . . .
. . .
If the present trend continues through the
next decade, we'll face an irreversible national and
international crisis of unprecedented scope—a crisis
that will have a dire effect on the quality of your
life, the cost of living, the quality and quantity
of food that will be available to you, and on America's
international relations, [emphasis added]^^
The change in the quality of life the Trust refers to may
be the disappearance of rural landscape, although it does
not say this or, at any rate, say why this is bad. Its
reasons for why we should mobilize and act to prevent
farmland from disappearing are instrumental ones about the
loss of a commodity. Here is a situation in which
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homocentrism is in conflict with itself; the development
interest clashes with the farm interest. The homocentrists
may be undermining the "quality" of their existence, but
who is to argue that such actions are wrong? Surely not
other homocentrists! Homocentrists have no language with
which to express the idea that something beyond economic
value is being lost, something deeply intertwined with
another kind of existence for which we only have the roman-
ticizing word "pastoral." Back to the idea of costs and
benefits .
Whether the homocentrist argues for optimal
pollution"'"''" or optimal development, the unprincipled will
trudges along unbothered by the notion of optiraality.
When is the optimal point reached? When does a productive
action become just plain wrong? The homocentrist cannot
answer this question. To illustrate this point, we can
move to a slightly different context. Call this context
the question of optimal land use.
The American Farmland Trust suggests paying
farmers "the difference between the land's assessed agri-
1
2
cultural value and its development value," so that the
land is not lost to development. This is a losing battle.
There is a certain dependence on the real estate value
remaining high enough so that an incentive to the farmer
remains. Otherwise, if the difference between the agri-
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cultural value and the development value are fairly close
together, the farmer may decide either way. He may reason
that he would be better off to sell the farm to development
and not be bothered with labor and worry about crop and
livestock prices every year. As long as the farmer is
understood as an entrepreneur much like the developer, the
farmer will behave according to the same principles of
self interest as the developer.
The reason why farmers sell out to land interests
is, of course, economic. As a businessman, the farmer can
no longer afford to remain in business. Looked at another
way, land is being treated as a commodity both by the
developer and the farmer. As long as these two enterprises
are made to compete for the same land treated as a commod-
ity value, the developer will more often win the struggle
because he is able to command a higher price than the
farmer.
If we turn to the pages of Wendell Berry's book
1
3
The Gift of Good Land
,
we will find a discussion through-
out the essays about the nature of farming, that is, a
concept of land in relation to a concept of a person who
works the land and is tied to the land. Berry's perplexity
about the ways of modern farming and the takeover of the
farm by agribusiness is due to his inattention to his own
concept. Yet Berry's concept is of enormous importance.
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.
not
In ter.s of the l™™edlate argument, U serves to show why
environmental optlmallty cannot be achieved by calculat
If consciousness is bent on maximizing profit, It wlU
stop to ask If an optimal point has been reached. That Is,
the concept of optlmallty cannot be understood as a measurl-
ment when the measured Item Is a function of wants and
desires. Optlmallty, in this context. Is a product of a
consciousness seeking a form of moderation that serves the
self in its relation to the substance shaping that con-
sciousness
.
Similar observations can be made about the homo-
centric consciousness as it deals with commodities or
"goods." An amenity like countryside is a good, but instru-
mentalists make such amenities good in relation to the
attainment of relative wealth. Land is valuable for the
attainment of social wealth. The homocentrist
, whose
wants are usually limited only by practical necessity, can-
not argue for the preservation of, say, open space except
as one commodity among others. Perhaps the homocentrist
is an "outdoorsperson" and wants to hike in wilderness
areas in leisure time. This commodity has to be weighed
against the same piece of land as a valuable natural
resource area. Which homocentrist has the better argument?
Perhaps neither one, we think, for these are both relative
wants and there is no external source of justification
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for such wants. Their claims are really no different fro.
the claims of other homocentrists
. The farmland interest
may claim that if the development interest has its way we
will run out of food in a decade. While they may be right,
no good grounds appear to exist for their position. Con-
sider that developers must suffer the same consequences as
the general population. Do they really believe that they
must make a choice between developing land or having
enough food to eat? No, they more likely believe that if
they become rich enough through their enterprise they will
be among the few who can afford to buy food when it becomes
scarce.
These interrogations make it possible to observe
that the notion of the "environment" is simplistic and
misleading. As long as ordinary people are made to think
that the environment is a commodity, an item capable of
being sliced and shared among participants in a social
order, then there can be such notions as optimal pollution,
because people and policy analysts will be able to think
in terms of "external diseconomies" or "externalities."
That is, they will think of social costs as commodity
values just as much as industrial producers think in
terms of the costs of production. Both "costs" are on
an equal footing except that many individuals in the same
population are producers making rational decisions to
35
profit from their activities, and, as an aggregate, make
macro-decisions productive of such social costs.
What's in a concept, we might ask? For if people
did not think of the environment as a material place in
which they live, then they would not be able to think of
it as a collection of items capable of being divided up
among themselves. They would, of necessity, think of it
as a part of the very meaning of themselves. That they
do think of it as an external thing is manifestly what is
meant by the bifurcation in consciousness. First, human
subjecthood was cut off from nature objecthood, then the
very concept of subjecthood succumbed to the forces of
reification. The interrogation brings this out clearly.
The problem Berry experiences throughout the
pages of his book reflects the problem of the bifurcation,
of the reified subject in whom all values are subjective.
Yet, it will be questioned why the bifurcation concept
should be thought significant. The atomistic subject of
industrial society is found to be the most efficient kind
of subject for the operation of the multiple dimensions
of production and service. Berry's idea of agricultural
production is so profoundly at odds with the commodity
version of farming that one cannot help but draw the con-
clusion that two very different types of human being are
involved in these two kinds of activity. Fundamentally,
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s
the industrial consumer is the product of a complex lan-
guage of advertising, market, money, and profits leading
back to consumption. The concept of work embedded in thi
abstract language follows abstract actions of creating
markets and consumer demand. The concept of work in
Berry's understanding of farming has nothing in common
with the abstraction of consumption and creating demand.
The interrelationship of worker and land meant that the
human worker was defined by an activity which incorporated
that place into the life fabric. Farmland turned to com-
modity production redefines the farmer as abstract pro-
ducer, a part of the language of markets. The significance
of the bifurcated consciousness can be drawn from these
observations
.
The significance of the bifurcation
When human consciousness encompasses only the social
world instead of the whole world of being, the eventual
result is a narrowing focus on human society as the only
area for human concern. The view of many philosophers is
that anthropocentri sm describes this condition. The argu-
ment already offered is that such philosophers have neg-
lected to notice how human selfhood changes along with a
change in consciousness. The analytical interrogation has
accordingly focused on the self and its meanings with
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respect to such changes. Human-centeredness is therefore
an opaque idea because it can indicate two or r.ore different
conditions of human consciousness. With anthr5pos as the
center, it is fully possible to recover an understanding
of the nonhuman world in terms of its own meanings. Granted
the obscurity of this statement, it is one of the purposes
of this work to explain the idea. With homos as the center
we have the totally familiar idea of viewing the nonhuman
world from the standpoint of a social condition in which
the notion of a nonhuman subject is incoherent. Thus we
view nonhumans as natural resources, as scientific objects,
as useful objects, or as pests. The incoherence is a
function of the logic of the bifurcated consciousness.
The concept of work and this notion of an incoher-
ence together form elements of an explanation about the
significance of a bifurcated consciousness. For the idea
indicates far more than a mere splitting apart of society
and nature; it indicates a certain kind of humanity forming
a certain kind of social system, making impossible a kind
of work that ties a human subject to a place, a location
more or less timeless. A built environment gives clues
as to its historical location, say, medieval or modern
or late 20th century. Land, relatively untouched, gives
no clue about the historical sense of any humanity in-
habiting it. We indicate our historical sense of ourselves
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more or
by the material environment we create. We become
less alienated from timeless places; although many moderns
enjoy "the great outdoors," they generally retreat again
back into the doors of time. Nature, understood as
ahistorical and timeless, is the place of timeless being,
the mute world. Society, the context maker, the creator
of time, formulates for its population the modes of action
and the kinds of work which help to stabilize the contex-
tual meanings supporting these very same action orientations,
The bifurcation of consciousness indicates the loss
of a luminous intelligibility that wild nature held for
some humans. Scientific rationality only places a frame
of understanding over wild nature that brings the conscious-
ness of time to bear on the essentially timeless, thus
taking away the essence it would claim to capture.
At this point the interrogation runs into the
"so what?" question. So what if consciousness has changed?
In terms of the question of consciousness a powerful answer
is available. One place to begin to answer the challenge
is with the observed commonplace incoherence of everyday
experience. Environmentalism
,
given social meaning, refers
to the qualities that many feel enhance a certain idea of
a good life. We moderns know what they are: clean air;
unpolluted waterways, potable, good-tasting water; freedom
from crowding; freedom from excessive loud noise;
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esthetically pleasing cities and parks; and, of course,
the ability to get out to the great outdoors.
It is just at such junctures that our conflicting
wants and desires show up. For, as a social good, a com-
modity such as clean air must be weighed against other,
economic goods. Wants must also be balanced against wants.
But the concept of clean air is almost impossible to sepa-
rate from a host of other concepts that refer to one type
of world and not to another. "World" itself refers to
formulators, or creators of it; so it is a manifestation
of its beings and not a thing apart. Clean air cannot
therefore be a wanted good in the same sense in which
society chooses cameras or fast cars, or efficient cars
rather than efficient trains. Rather, clean air is a
quality of being, a manifestation of a way of life.
Ask the average American if he or she wants clean
air; the answer will certainly be yes. But ask if they
are willing to bear the higher costs involved and there
may very well be hesitation. Then ask such Americans if
they would like to see an alternative technology, different
and fewer products, and a very different way of life;
their fear of change will come to the fore. Then they
really do not want clean air. Our homocentric environ-
mentalists, perhaps naively, believe that they can have it
both ways, unlimited industrial growth with lower prices
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and environmental goods. Perhaps they do not realize the
sweeping implication of wanting clean air or clean beaches
or more rural countryside.
The incoherence of wanting environmental goods
without seeking the social context that fosters such
qualities as a matter of its own logic is an incoherence
of social consciousness. Accordingly, the social actors
do not understand the implication of the contradictoriness
of their wants. Such inner contradictions derive from a
self-definition as a locus of preferences (which themselves
are not rooted in a social modality consti tuative of
individual meaning) where the true origin of these free-
floating preferences are difficult to trace. Preferences
function in a commodity network to give the appearance of
freedom of choice, an illusion that stems from the dictates
of marketing techniques. Voter preferences and individual
values function to lend support to the myth of democracy.
Bound up with the levers of a corporate controlled market,
the idea of choice, political, economic, social, or per-
sonal, grows out of the same myth of individual autonomy
in a democratic state. The extreme pressures to orient
oneself toward the production choices made by the market
managers and the social pressures to orient oneself toward
the illusion of freedom lend support to the myth of the
individual as politically, economically, and morally
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autonomous
.
The point of this observational evidence is to argue
that environmental understanding (or, if you wish, ecologi-
cal intelligence) is a function of selfhood. Human under-
standing as a component of human identity is the missing
element in most quests for epistemological certitude. We
are what we know, and to know is to be. To be a product
of the manipulated market is to accept the forms of ration-
ality congenial to the process or medium of economic deter-
minants. Such rationality can never grasp the concept of
self as a medium of relational benevolence toward the
world as subject.
The first stage of the bifurcation was the separa-
tion of the individual qua subject from the possibility
of relational understanding; and in this process the indi-
vidual became attached to a self-understanding as rational.
But this meant that the individual was dependent upon the
notion that only cognition taken as activity of the brain,
fully apart from the body's environment, determined what
one knew or could know. In this subtle sense, the indi-
vidual became divorced from his/her own body. In the
second stage of the bifurcation, the individual as knower
was open to any cognitive environment; and, for reasons
that must be omitted here, that environment became the
commodity network by which the individual became an object.
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In a commodity network there may be no good way to
distinguish between humans and things, and, therefore,
between nonhumans and things. In this network, human social
relations take the form of techniques for economic effi-
ciency, and thus embody forms of exploitation. As exploi-
tative methods are used on nonhuman life as an approach
legitimated by public policies, the idea of exploitation
is taken to be a perfectly normal operation of society.
What should be observed about the total context in which
this social method takes place is the transformation of
key concepts which in one form or another have guided many
kinds of human existence. Most notable is the concept of
an "end" toward which becoming is to be oriented. In the
commodity network the end of life is to serve this gigan-
tic abstraction. There is no other end, nothing we should
be, other than servants of this process.
The import of this view, homocentric self and
social relations as a recent phenomenon, is how the problem
of morality flows out of this condition. In this homo-
centric form the problem of morality appears to be pro-
foundly more unsolvable than most social theorists have
thought, even as they considered it in more benign terms.
There are two parts to this problem, although hardly
noticed as having two parts or dimensions. The human/nature
controversy in its contemporary form deals with "environ-
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mental ethics," and takes a question such as the following
as being both intelligible and answerable: do we (humans)
owe any duties to wild nature? The second part suggests
how an answer could be made to the first: the problems
and controversies regarding our moral history, human pos-
tures no longer tenable—such as Kant's unconditional
ought—and the meaning of these disintegrations. Somewhat
naively, perhaps, it could be asked how, if our moral tra-
ditions have collapsed, can we have obligations to nonhuman
life when we seem to have lost our sense of obligation to
each other? Alasdair Maclntyre, having recently traced
this history, seems at a loss as to how to recover the
human subject who would embody moral qualities. Maclntyre
remarks that
:
.
. .
We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we
continue to use many of the key expressions. But
we have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our
comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of
morality . 1^
The explanation given here for this loss of compre-
hension moves on a different level of theorizing. Mac-
lntyre 's analysis, taking the form of an historical argu-
ment, traces the disintegrations of moral traditions and
their cohesiveness . The present inquiry, abstracting
from history, conceptualizes the homocentrist to be the
logical outcome of these disintegrations, and thereby
the maker of an amoral, object-oriented, society.
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Homocentrism, as an explanation of this descript
of what moderns have become, brings to the idea of the indi-
vidual qua social atom a further idea which illuminates the
problem of appearance without substance. The bifurcation
of consciousness could not long endure in the form of an
autonomous human subject because the splitting apart of the
subject from wild nature as subject meant the end of
anthropos, the end of human existence interconnected with
the means of knowing oneself as an essence. The point
is that when the community of ideas and the social under-
standing as part of these gave way, the individual as
subject gave way with it. The path to the ob jec tif ication
of the individual and society was cleared.
This conceptual schema concerning the significance
of the bifurcation brings us to see that a simple dichot-
omy between the individual and community leads to a false
understanding of the problem. That problem, once again,
is the argument between certain environmentalists (who are
also preservationists) and the rest of society about
whether there is something fundamentally wrong with our
system of ideas and beliefs. If homocentric consciousness
represents a problem, then that problem is essentially
moral in nature. The path to social objectif ication was
made by numerous contributions to our self-understanding.
Significant was the idea of the social contract and its
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implications for the concept of morality. Perhaps an argu-
ment by exemplification will bring out the point.
If our moral language is about contracts, about
such things as not taking unfair advantage of another per-
son, or not stealing, then people are vulnerable to attack
by other people; although, with respect to a tacit under-
standing, we do not do such things because we want to live
in peace. Of course those, such as animals, who are not
party to the contract, are vulnerable to attack by people.
As an aside, it would be irrelevant for one to counter
that animals live in a world of predation where one species
attacks another. It is irrelevant because this is a world
of homeostasis where the good of the community of beings
is served by the sacrifice of some individuals to others.
It can be argued that contractual schemes are the human
way of producing harmony in a human com.munity. Nonetheless,
this comparison misses the idea about what happens to our
moral understanding in a contractual social scheme. The
sense of the individual as embodying moral precepts gives
way to an individual motivated to act (or react) in re-
sponse to multiple levers and social controls. The indi-
vidual no longer asks: what is the good toward which I
should direct my life? Instead, the individual asks: how
can I best live my life so that I am caused the minimum of
harm and realize the most satisfaction?
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The shift is not from the communal good (or the
good of the state) to the good of the individual; rather,
it is a shift from individual self-understanding as a
subject and carrier of moral ideals shared with a community
(and as will be afgued later, produced by that community)
to an increasingly isolated social actor who becomes de-
tached from purposive contexts bearing some moral ideal.
In consequence, all aspects of life, human and nonhuman,
lying beyond immediate wants, needs, and desires of indi-
viduals, produce an inner response equivalent to a "dis-
tancing" of oneself from immediacy, from existential
judgements, and from occasions not of personal concern.
Note well the modern origin of the word "personal," which
attaches to "private," suggesting onion-like layers of
being leading to an inner core akin to a void.
That wonderfully ambiguous word "privacy," so
closely related to the "personal," is becoming obsolete.
For, as has been noted many times in the literature on
technocracy, when there is nothing but the private life,
the word loses its potency from lack of contrast. Indi-
viduals in mass society are increasingly led to embrace
privacy through the proliferation of electronic gadgetry
which in turn narrows their consciousness further, making
them less and less aware of an outside world as in any
significant way related to their personal lives. Homo-
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centrism, then, might be described as a sociaily created
consciousness in which people have largely lost conscious-
ness of themselves as meaningfully connected to the wider
world. And with this break in connectedness is a break
in moral inders tanding
,
a break with agency qua subject.
It should be pointed out that this schema does
not arise from a "romanticism" or nostalgia for a mythical
past imagined to be somehow better than the present.
Rather, the concern here is with a form of consciousness
that could, in a logical sense, reappear once again. For
this reappearance of ecocentric consciousness is the whole
thrust of this work.
The meaning of the bifurcation has been explained
as a reduction or truncation of humanity; and it was argued
that the reduction was moral in nature. Then we made some
headway toward explaining the concept of morality as a
component of consciousness. This effort continues with
a model of humanity conscious of itself in terms of key
ideas about moral existence. "Land," "self," and "partici-
pation" should be understood relational ly . In the follow-
ing sketch it should be kept in mind that certain features
of nonmodern life do not apply to the present, but certain
features are fundamental to moral consciousness in any
time or place.
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Ecocentrism: a definition
Contemporary Amerindians in various parts of the
U.S. explain that the reason they were involved in lawsuits
with government to regain access and control of large
parcels of land is because they are a part of the land
and the land is a part of them. What they mean is that
the Indian self is created in a language that is largely
about the self making a living from the land. The self's
identity is created from language and action that is v^holly
out of place apart from the land. A displaced Indian is
an Indian without a self. One could adduce the high rate
of Indian suicides to this kind of loss. The self derives
its meaning from the land and the land takes its meaning
from the nature of the Indian self. The presence of non-
human subjects in Indian languages sounds fitting to modern
ecocentrists .
The Amerindians' relation in consciousness to the
land is understood in terms of language and action. Their
selves are bound up with a place where a "living" is made.
A "living" here refers to a unity through which a self
coheres, through which a life has a meaning in relation
to a place inhabited by ancestors. The scientific ecolo-
gist has two words to explain the meaning of making a
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living. In the words of Paul Colinvaux, a
^^ :
•
'niche' is more than just a physical place:It IS a place m the grand scheme of things. Thenicheis an animal's (or a plant's) profession,
to ? °f ''^^
wolf-spider is everything it doesget Its food and raise its babies. To be able todo these things it must relate properly to the placewhere it lives and to other inhabitants of thatplace. Everything the species does to survive and
stay tit m the Darwinian sense is its niche.
The physical living space in an ecologist'sjargon is called the habitat . The habitat is the
address' or location in which individuals of a
species live. The woodland floor hunted by wolf-
spiders is the habitat, but wolf
-spidering is their
niche. lo
The Indian's land, habitat, and niche provide the
very possibility for self
-identi ty . Just as without a
habitat there could be no wolf
-spidering
, so the Indian's
total way of life is not possible without his land.
There is no difficulty in stating that language,
thought, and action manifest the self; the difficulty
arises when one attempts to depict language use and to
examine it for indications of purposive behavior, since
purpose can be understood in multiple ways quite apart
from simple goal-directed actions. Returning to the above
example will illustrate this difficulty and how it may be
overcome
.
To argue that Indian and land are one is to
state the thesis that the Indian self is realized in the
matrix created by making an Indian-living, analogous to
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wolf-spidering. Language, thought, and action crystall:
to form a self. If the Indian is then forced from his
land and, say, given a place to live in Sioux City, Iowa
(complete with a government subsidy), that self is de-
stroyed. Realization of self by way of a relation to the
"land" can justifiably be called ecocentrism. For an
Indian to sell the land (as if it were a piece of property)
is to sell his self (as if it could be transferred).
The sense in which a self is realized is the sense
in which a purpose is realized. Purpose here means some-
thing different from short run rationalized purposes, but
is rather attached to the concept of an end. In this
sense we can say that a purpose is an orientation. Language
reflects a people's orientation. One cannot confuse the
orientation of a Karam villager in New Guinea with the
orientation of a Wall Street broker; we cannot say that
their purposes are at all comparable, or that they both
have purpose in the same sense. The relational concept
is illustrated by showing that the language of the Karam
people attaches to objects that are ends in themselves.
Their orientation could be depicted through an analysis of
their language. By further investigation, one can know
something about their end-purpose, the sura total of their
actions, although it may not be possible to experience
the "meaning" of those purposive behaviors because an
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inquirer is not a Karam self.
Still, there is but one ecocentrism and its rela-
tional language can be recognized by other ecocentrists
.
Other things being equal, ecocentric selfhood is one type
of consciousness which superficial differences in cultures
cannot obviate. In order to say that the ecocentric self
is a human type to be found in different times and places,
it must be possible to identify the general characteristics
which constitute this self. The constituents of relational
selfhood are the moral characteristics. The "land ethic"
is an expression for the thriving relational self.
The relational self
The relational self is a concept about persons in
an ecocentric community. The relational self can also be
found in anthropocentric communities in which people share
a common destiny. In this case, the common bond is a
moral ideal. In the former case, ecological obligation
belongs to the concept of a relational self. We will refer
here only to the former concept of the self.
To speak of this relation is already to lay the
basis for an elaborating of the idea of a land ethic. The
meaning of the relational self can only be grasped in terms
of the component concepts of communal ends, the moral
nature of land, and the nonhuman inhabitants of the
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communi ty
.
The moral concept of land
Land, in our moral conception, is an aspect of the
self. Land means an internalization of all the Earth's
inhabitants, including aquatic species, and their ways
of life. Person, Land, and Species is the relational triad
which is our sense of community. Our moral concept of
land, then, is precisely this relational self, a bonding
or unifying consciousness.
Now if land meant only cultivated land, then the
whole idea of a bond would be spurious and a person's
attachment to land would be either instrumental or senti-
mental or both. For the ecocentrist, land is something
to which one belongs, not something which belongs to some-
one. If there is nominal ownership it is a practical
convenience regarding individual responsibility for a
place. Wild land or wilderness is also a place to which
one belongs. Clearly not all land can be wild and still
support modern human life, but a certain wilderness is
essential to the ecocentric relation. Preservation here
means the preservation of the relational self because in
concept it is not distinguishable from the land and its
inhabitants; there is a common destiny. In a manner of
speaking, we have here a rather different kind of self-
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preservation. That is, individual needs are understood
only in terms of the triad. The concept of land, then,
is a place, a habitat, a community, a bond, depending on
how we seek to view it. In each case there is a moral
relation
.
Clearly, we are discussing the self rather than
ecological practices as such. The ecocentric community
was shown to be oriented toward the preservation of the
relational triad, which in practical terms issues in dimen-
sions of action. One such dimension is to use ecological
knowledge to care for wilderness; in another dimension,
wise cultivation practices are called for; in still an-
other, there are ways to use urban land so that it does not
become an industrial sewer. These actions need not be
specified in detail since the question of the relational
self in action goes beyond the present discussion.''"''
The concepts of homocentrism and ecocentrism have
been set out, showing why there is no moral relation between
human and land, or between human and nonhuman , or (in the
sense we have explained) even between human and human.
The bedrock of being, which was discussed in the beginning
of this chapter, has now been defined. The triad is the
universal element in all human thinking that is properly
called moral. Although the word "moral" would seem to
be contestable in homocentric society, its sense in prac-
tical ter.s is limited to a variety of incoherent codes
of behavior which, in each domain, supply the directions
for conduct appropriate to homocentrism.
The most crucial idea expressed by the thesis now
propounded is the epistemological mythology propagated by
homocentric society. It makes a distinction between
"practical" knowledge and pure or theoretical knowledge.
True, this view would seem to have come from Aristotle;
however, the interpretation is couched in homocentric
language. Thus, homocentrists can make a distinction
between fact and value because they take these words to
have demonstrable meaning and because they have split their
world into a realm of objectivity and one of relativism.
In this way any member of society in the western countries
can hold any view desired since, in a deep sense, all are
ultimately homogenized into the same view.
One must be extremely careful here. In the kind
of society described earlier as a generalized Amerindian
society, it could not be said that its members (in any
given tribe) held or wished to hold differing beliefs.
Yet, we would be misled to think that this too was a form
of homogenized thought and action. The argument for this
will be an indirect one. In essence, the difference is
between a social system in which commodity production,
a ruling idea, governs social behavior, and a form of
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life in which individuals derive meaning, sense, and
purpose from their existential context. Individual
interconnected in their understanding of their lives. In
homocentric society, individuals are disconnected but are
obliged to conform to external modes of conduct that have
only extrinsic import for their lives.
The critical edge to our conceptual elaboration
comes to this. The homocentrist
,
according to contempo-
rary notions, is an autonomous individual even while he
lives in a bureaucratic society. But it is not bureau-
cratic society as such that creates a problem for the
individual; rather, it is the idea that something called
"moral knowledge" should play a part in everyday life.
Homocentrists
,
being devoid of the triadic relation, gain
an understanding of themselves by being directed and
invented. The technos tructure shapes consciousness;
as requisites of a human community disappear, so too does
the relation to place, a defined quality of a people.
Preview and Summary
The thesis is now stated in all of its essentials.
The next two chapters will deal with two aspects of the
moral problem. First, the question of ecological obliga-
tion is addressed in terms of the homocentric-ecocentric
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tension. The point to emerge fror. chapter two is that
the forr. of objective knowledge, moral reasoning leads to
paradoxes or to precepts that are less than compelling when
the moral question concerns nonhuman life. The conclusion
is drawn that discursive argument about what society ought
to do about animals and wild places is an incoherent ques-
tion when the purposes of homocentric society are consid-
ered. Second, the question intimated in chapter one is
taken up in chapter two. If purely rational-discursive
ideas about human obligations to nature fail to offer any
solution to the problem of extinction and the problem of
cruelty, what is the real nature of the problem, and how
should it be dealt with? Better still, how could the
problem be avoided? The answer is a revision of social
theory based on a new psychology of the nature of human
wants and desires. This revisionary thesis is continued
in chapter three in the same interrogatory fashion, prob-
ing the ideas and reasons of homocentric thinking. Ego-
ism, or "enlightened" egoism, is a product of homocentric
social arrangements; then the interrogation must require
some other form of thinking, some other basis for revising
the theory of society. In chapter four, the problem is
explored in terms of the concerns, warnings, and fears of
political ecologists. All along, the problem has been
the question of a revision of homocentric thinking, and
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why such a revision is crucial. The reader should not
expect in these pages to find any discussion about environ-
mental theory except as it is intimately related to the
single concern of this work: the problem of selfhood.
The revision of consciousness entails the theory
of the sustainable society. This version of society is
a product of a type of selfhood just as homocentrism is
a product of another human type. Thus, the denouement
of this work is reached at the end of chapter three.
Chapter four deals with the contemporary confusion con-
cerning problems most serious thinkers consider major.
The results of the interrogation are applied to the dis-
cussions found in this literature.
In sum, the thesis is a new version of ecological
obligation. It says that moral ideas are so intimately
bound up with the idea of selfhood that no intellectual
ethic propounded from within homocentric society can ever
have the sense of a meaning and purpose for human social
existence. Such a purposeful existence depends on a
close relation between human and nonhuman nature. There-
fore, human morality is integral to ecological thinking.
CHAPTER II
RELATIONAL OR THE DISRELATIONAL SELF?
The Problem of Rational and Moral Thinking
Western European thought for the last several cen-
turies has involved a question about the rational way to
arrive at an ethic which would be both logically consistent
and socially accepted. After the foundations of rational-
ist thought crumbled, there seemed to be no rational edi-
fice that would support the various claims of reason based
on the supposition of human supremacy. This latter notion
was, however, very old, having defenders long before
Porphyry. But an idea which grew out of this, a more
recent idea, concerns a narrow version of human conscious-
ness. The idea, of course, is egoism. Versions of the
social contract, in which competing egos form a rational
order capable of accommodating the wants and needs of all,
restricted the sense in which ethical relations could
intelligibly be discussed.
For reasons now made clear, the focus of ideas in
recent history centered progressively on a human-centered
society, one, it was argued, that contained the seeds of
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homocentrism. The effort in this chapter is to .ake a
complex move that proceeds on two levels, both with the
aim of refining an epistemic theory grounded in a concept
of the self. Instead of a merely cognitive-rational
approach to the problem of-morality, a reconceptualization
of the problem is made by interrogating the relation of
human society to wild nature. Toward this end, the purely
intellectual idea of an "animal rights" ethic is contrasted
with the concept of a relational community. It will be-
come clear why an ethic toward animals that belongs to
an ideology integral to homocentrism fails to address the
problem.
Consistent with the claim that anthropos is the
model for any possible development of the ecocentric out-
look, it would be profitable to turn to the Aristotelian
idea of community. In Aristotle, one finds the type of
man (not woman) whose sense of community is decidedly
hierarchical and closed, yet importantly relational. The
self's relation to the community orients it to certain
social ends. The final goal of human action in community
is the good both of the community and the individual.
The potentiality of the individual can only be realized
in community, not apart from it. The relation itself
constituted the possibility for moral or intellectual
virtue. One finds, however, that Aristotle's community
is an artificial construct that was bound to disappear,
taking with it the relational morality. It is not the
virtues, but the relation which made the virtues possible
that is the importance of Aristotle's model of Greek
communi ty
.
The anthropocentric relational self
The history of the self or consciousness does not
concern us here; only the eventual disintegration of the
relational self concerns us. The inevitable question,
then, is why did the relational structure which held moral
consciousness together finally fail?
It has often been said that the exclusion of women
and slaves from the quest for virtue formed some part of
an answer to why the experiment failed, whereas very little
attention has been paid to the anthropocentri sm and its
moral context. In fact, much of what is taken for essen-
tial ingredients of excellence or virtue is embedded in
this anthropocentric consciousness. For instance, Aristotle
tells us that the aim of ethical study is not knowledge
1
9
but (rational) action. Accordingly, the Greek concept
of praxi
s
is confined to rational man and excludes ani-
20
mals. The very idea of moral excellence takes place
21
within a hierarchy of being, with man in the pol i
s
near
the top, and the man of moral wisdom at the pinnacle.
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Human excellence is the ability to engage in rational and
moral activity, but the rationality of moral activity is
prescribed to fit the Greek image of man as the highest
realization of animal life. Aristotle says in the Meta-
physics
All things are ordered together somehow, but not allalike--both fishes and fowls and plants; and the worldIS not such that one thing has nothing to do with
another, but they are connected.
In order to have a hierarchy, the forms of life must cul-
minate with the ideal, and what is ideal can only be few
in number. The relation, then, is not a relation in com-
munity amongst equals. In this scheme there could be no
sense of common destiny between man in community and animal
life, certainly not in a moral sense.
John Rodman points out that Pythagoras and Empedo-
cles "... exhibited in both theory and practice a deep
sense of the kinship of human and nonhuman (especially
2 3
animal) life." Aristotle would not have seen "kinship"
in the orderly connectedness of things. For him, moral
life is reserved for rational beings alone. The rational
life of man in community, then, is an exclusive sort of
relation, and it would have seemed odd to Aristotle to
include nonhuman life in a moral perspective.
In effect, the contemporary quest for an environ-
mental morality is an attempt to undo the work of two
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millennia. But it seems particularly strange that, with
the widospread recognition that all moral ideas ultimately
fail, some philosophers should still seek an ethic con-
cerning not just humans but the environment or nonhuman
life .
In this era of high technology, many people sense
that we are locked into a dead-end, and so want to revise
our course, believing that a different world is possible.
If it is, we are moving beyond the idea of mere social
change; we are instead talking about a fundamental altera-
tion of consciousness. This much we have already made
clear. Less clear is how we are to conceive an environ-
mental morality which alters consciousness. It should be
pointed out that the ecocentric relational conception of
morality is obscure because the bifurcated consciousness
is the historically dominant one. It would be well to
bracket this concept of ecocentrism temporarily in order
to more fully discuss the idea of an environmental ethic
as it appears superficially.
Some philosophers have noted a possible distinction
between a morality that is about the environment and one
that stems from or is derived from it. To date there have
been few contributions to the latter idea, primarily
because no compelling "ought" has been found. Indeed,
what would compel the di srelational self to suddenly
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follow "nature" or a set of ecological principles?
Since the discovery that moral oughts have no
foundation, modern individualists hit upon the idea that
although there may not be a moral good, there are "rights."
Somehow a "natural right" could never be philosophically
established so it is not clear in what sense there are
rights. Among the contemporary theorists who attempt to
explain what a right is and who has it, some ethical
theorists have decided that animals are among the holders
of rights. No one has yet established from where these
rights came. Although the language of contracts continues
to pervade our moral discourse, such quasi-legal ideas
are suitable only in light of a self
-definition which
discovers its validation in the process of being directed
from without. According to the premise set out in chapter
one, the idea of an animal rights ethic is a logical
outcome of homocentrism
. Drawing on its version of egali-
tarian democracy, animal rights theorists seem to feel
that homocentric society can readily understand such ideas
and incorporate them. But if animals are granted rights
(of any kind), the implications of this for human society
need to be spelled out.
What is being examined here is a variation of the
ontological conflict between homocentrism and varieties
of ecocentrism. The animal rights thesis, based on
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hcocentrls™, will be confronted by ecocentrlc relational
being. First, the problem of anthropocentrlc relational
being must be set out.
The anthropocentric relational sel f
The diagram in chapter one depicted on the hori-
zontal line the anthropocentric stage of human and nonhuman
nature. A certain human-centeredness did not preclude it
being ordered together with nonhuman life. The fact that
some Greeks spoke about a hierarchy of being does not
change the main consideration that human and nonhuman nature
were conceived to be on one plane or continuum of being.
The bifurcation of the line indicated that nonhuman sub-
jects had disappeared, and that only the human subject
qua person remained, at least for a time.
Finally the subject "human" falls back on a new
plane and the object "nature" also falls back on a new
plane. Whereas, on the original horizontal plane, the
subject was invented, thereby making possible the idea that
beings were subjects and later that some subjects had
more status than others, it was not until the bifurcation
that some subjects became things or objects while others
remained subjects. How could this distinction be main-
tained in consciousness indefinitely? Consciousness had
finally to fall back on a new plane such that the
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distinction vanished.
We know that the bifurcation rendered nonhumans
into objects, but how could humans remain subjects? The
distinction is an artificial one which consciousness could
not forbear. The anthropocentrist viewed all things as
connected somehow; now this no longer held true. The
idea of connectedness was that some subjects qua persons
could attain a knowledge or insight into the workings of
things of which they themselves formed some part. If, now,
the self forms no part of the things it tries to know,
but is wholly separable and apart, then the self stands
apart from all other life as if it had come full-blown
into a world, and tries to know the other world as objects
which function entirely by a different set of principles.
Only if all things are connected somehow could the world
of subjects be sustained. Once living objects are created,
it begins to appear inevitable that the distinction will
fail and all life will become object life.
Aristotle had to reconcile his view that "all
things are ordered together somehow" with his conception
of the moral situation. The moral dimension of human life
could be realized only within the construct of a community
as a relation. Morality could not be involved with non-
human life. Whereas there is an ontological connection
between human and nonhuman life, it is only in the human
community that the depth of a man's character could be
known. This is the human-centered element.
This anthropocentrism is found in the understanding
that although there was a certain aristocracy of virtue in
Aristotle's community, there was also a recognition of
human worth. For though it is true that slaves qua slaves
were instruments, slaves qua men were also the subjects of
24justice. To speak precisely, the slave qua man was not
an object but rather a subordinate subject in tne moral
scheme of things. This contrasts sharply with the democ-
racy of thinghood we have come to know as homocentrism
.
What we are driving at, however, is that although animals
were regarded by Aristotle as still more subordinate, they
too were a part of being. The idea is that there are
gradations of being in nature which " . , . in most of
the other animals can be discerned traces of the psycho-
logical modes which attain their clearest differentiation
25in man." We can now see the subject in an anthropo-
centric perspective.
What can we conclude about Aristotle's conception
of the anthropocentric relational self? We can say that
its pursuits were closely connected with the good of the
community of rational and social members. The self was
inherently moral, being devoted to a life of actions aimed
at the mutual good of the community. There was nothing
67
simple about this quest, since there could be tragic con-
flicts of good with good, but this point need not concern
us. The rational life was only possible in co..unity, and
rational action was the pursuit of the good. This rela-
tional morality was genuine because it constituted an ethos
and formed a way of life. The interest we have in this
Aristotelian vision is just this relational morality or
community since it is the model for a new relational moral-
ity. However, since its theoretical basis is anthropocen-
tric, the need here is for a further theory which would
allow a transition to ecocentric ideas. The anthropocen-
trism of Aristotelian community meant in moral terms that
since the "lower" forms existed for the sake of "higher"
forms, moral action could not be directed "downward."
There could be no moral reason for saving species had there
been endangered species. The relational self aimed only
"upward."
In our contemporary world of mass societies it is
very difficult to imagine being in relation to a community,
and far more difficult to imagine being in relation to
wild land and the inhabitants of that land. It would seem
that the relational self has disapppeared forever, but
this is not fully the case. The ontological tension
brought out in this work points to the idea that a sus-
tainable society based on ecocentric thinking is a real
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threat to homocentri sm
.
The disrelational self
In chapter one homocentric environmental concerns
were said to be manifest in occasional preferences for cer-
tain kinds of goods in terms of others. It is now time
to look at the disrelational self in conjunction with the
notion of an environmental ethic. From what has been so
far argued, it is clear that the homocentric disrelational
self embodies a rationality fundamentally inconsistent with
environmental thinking, and therefore inconsistent with
the moral tradition outside of social contract ideas.
Who is the disrelational self? From homocentric
discourse it is clearly a language about such things as
security, rights, benefits, and contracts, but who is the
person wanting these things? Let us put it another way.
What is the identity of the self we call "disrelational"?
Maclntyre contrasts Goffman's view that there is
no "true self" beyond the separate roles being played with
Sartre's view that a moral self exists wholly apart from
2 6its social roles. We mention this to bring out how the
whole controversy about the nature of the self and its
moral meaning is mistaken. Goffman thinks that there is
no such thing as moral language apart from the social
2 7institutions in which the self operates. Contrarily,
view
It should be brought out how odd It is to hold the
that a true or "authentic" self could exist apart fro™
a moral context made by such a being. Both Goff™an and
Sartre seem to presuppose an individualistic entity whose
person is either reflected in the sum of its social roles
or in its authenticity. In the latter case, Maclntyre
remarks that
Sartre's account provides a space within which onlyone new virtue can be practiced. For authenticityconsists precisely in the self making its words and
tttLl'f'/^' "^"'^^^^ ^^^y virtue hasnothing to do anymore with the content of actionbut only with its relationship to the self. 28
Outside of a moral context, words and deeds have no moral
import. Sartre's version of the authentic self is a
chimera. Both writers have assumed the disrelational self
It is important to see that neither of these versions
tells us anything about the self in community, the context
of moral action.
In this brief discussion of the problem it may
seem that Goffman does include, in fact insists upon,
such a context. But this is an illusion, for the disre-
lational self never realizes anything like a moral context
for its actions. The bureaucratic maze in which the dis-
relational self finds itself permits only social codes,
not a morality rooted in the self's being. "True morality
would seem to require both a self and a relational context
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But social roles are merely accidental; one could play
an entirely different set of roles. If such roles create
the self, then the self is no more than the sum of its
social roles, and these could not produce a morality of
the self.
Relational selfhood is taken here to be the only
possibility for morality. No other version of the self
seems to give a convincing account of how a genuine moral-
ity arises. Since the "authentic self" is not bound up
with an ontologically purposive existence, its purpose or
meaning as an authentic self is difficult to discover.
The extreme disrelation of this version of the self shows
as much emptiness as does Goffman's own version. In con-
trast, it was argued that moral purpose depends on moral
contexts as ends in themselves. The self's relation to
a moral context is absolutely essential for the coherence
of its action. Without context, the di srelational self's
connection with "duties" or "obligations" lacks all con-
viction, except perhaps as part of a subjective feeling
which has no objective reference for others.
Amidst this moral vacuity it is wholly illogical
to find people talking about an environmental ethic.
Clearly, when they do so they merely mean a set of "per-
sonal" preferences and not a genuine morality. For
instance we find one biologist saying that "However deeply
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and sincerely you may believe in an environmental ethic,
you cannot in a pluralistic democracy overrule public
values for what you deem to be the good of the public. "29
This interpretation of an environmental ethic
mirrors a widespread interpretation of morality generally.
It is said that a person's preferences for certain moral
choices may clash with those of other persons; but this
is inevitable when moral concepts reflect only the emotions
of attraction and aversion. Beyond this, a morality has
no objective basis. Hence, an ethic toward the environ-
ment necessarily reflects a personal preference based on
someone's emotional characteristics.
If objective and impersonal moral standards cannot
be rationally justified, then is it not misguided to speak
of a morality encompassing nonhuman elements of the world?
Certainly it would be difficult or impossible to justify
a principle of responsibility or of obligation toward the
environment. Who would willingly follow such principles?
There are of course simulacra of morality, for instance
codes of ethics, such as "business ethics," in which stan-
dards of conduct are erected essentially by fiat. If an
environmental ethic meant nothing more than a code of
conduct toward the environment, few people would comply
with it consistently. A deontological ethic toward or
about the environm.ent is an unsatisfactory idea because
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it is not clear what sense of purpose would direct homo-
centric society to treat the environment in a certain way.
If homocentrists often behave toward the environment so
as to endanger their own health or safety, how much more
far-fetched is it to ask them to act so as to safeguard the
well-being of nonhuman life simply for its own sake?
So it seems wildly absurd to speak about an envir-
onmental ethic which, as one contemporary ethicist, Tom
Regan, tells us, must follow two conditions:
(1) An environmental ethic must hold that there arenonhuman beings which have moral standing
(2) An environmental ethic must hold that the class
ot those beings which have moral standing includesbut IS larger than the class of conscious beings—that IS, all conscious beings and some nonconsciousbeings must be held to have moral standing. 30
It seems that by a simple instrumental measure of
human good we cannot act morally toward animals. That is,
if an animal dead benefits some humans without positive
harm to others, then there is no reason not to slaughter
the animal. Who then would follow an environmental ethic?
There are people who say that we ought to be "kind" to
animals or to treat them humanely. But why ought we to
do this? How does such a moral ought conform to any scheme
of things? Consciousness bifurcated has left our sense
of the animal world obscure, and talk of an environmental
ethic is equally obscure. Why should we not behave
morally toward plants, or even toward water or stones?
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And although there are some principles which scientists
might agree upon about what is beneficial for a given
ecosystem, such knowledge would not alone compel action.
Finding no purpose other than what might be considered
personally fulfilling, the di srelational self has no motive
for holding an environmental ethic in Regan's sense. It
is plain that environmental preferences for amenities such
as parks, clean beaches, campgrounds, and the like are
common instances of homocentric wants, but that such wants
are distinct from an environmental ethic.
To conclude, it is almost impossible to say what
the connection is between the di srelational self and an
environmental ethic in the homocentric context. The lack
of connection may be owing to the concerns of the disrela-
tional self for the satisfaction of its own wants on
cost-benefit terms alone. It is in this light that many
environmental ethicists appear to believe that a morality
toward the environment is an unreachable goal. In lieu
of this, a number of theorists have posited the idea of
rights for animals. Rights usually are the product of his-
toric agreements and are quasi-legal ideas. The circle
of rights holders was originally very narrow; contemporary
currents have widened the circle so that aliens, infants,
the elderly, children, the insane, perhaps even fetuses,
become holders of rights. With this widening of the human
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circle, some ethicists urge that the "human bias" be
abandoned to admit animals, and perhaps also plants and
land areas, to the circle, so that humans might represent
a forest as a holder of rights. The widening of this
circle to all kinds of rights, including the right of a
forest not to be cut down, admits law into an ostensibly
moral discussion.
In traversing the conceptual distance from the
idea of a moral community to this idea of rights holders
we have largely lost sight of an environmental ethic.
In place of the concept of moral goodness in a community
we have the concept of benefits for classes of entities.
Given the standard conflicts between human instrumental
interests and basic animal interests in a homocentric
society, animals will be denied their basic interests,
including their basic interest in survival. If we con-
tinue to press the rights for animals argument, we will
see that both an environmental ethic and the argument in
defense of animals are lost. Let us see how this comes
about
.
If all people aim at benefitting themselves, then
they will not aim at benefitting others except as a by-
product of satisfying their own desires. It is not
obvious that benefitting some animals for the animals'
own sake v\7ill in turn be beneficial, although it is
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obvious that animals serve instrumental interests. Animals
can satisfy human wants, although some of the wants or
interests they can satisfy are trivial or nonbasic. Ani-
mals will most often be denied their basic interests,
including their basic interest in well-being. We can see
that if animals are denied their basic interests, they
will also be denied rights or will not be recognized as
holders of rights.
Suppose, however, that wild animals are suddenly
recognized as holders of rights, meaning of course that
individual animals, not just species as a whole, could be
holders of rights. Then they would be granted interests
so that all animals recognized as having rights, say
zebras rather thean salamanders, would no longer be used
to serve instrumental interests. Think of the implications.
In effect, wild animals would no longer have any use value.
The concept of benefits would be so altered that many con-
ceivable uses for animals would be eliminated. The produc-
tion and distribution of coats made from wild animal fur,
for instance, would come to a halt. Notice that among the
vast changes entailed in human behavior would be a respect
for wildlife habitat; land, such as forests, would have
to be treated so as to benefit all of its inhabitants.
Large scale development could not take place and the
number of homes would be severely limited as more people
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would be pushed back to the cities where they would 1
in gigantic highrises. One implication of giving right
to animals is that humans would have to limit their
bers. The changes in human society would be vast.
Clearly, from the homocentrists ' point of view,
this kind of hypothetical situation would not come about.
Most people would not want to be deprived of the goods
and services which animals provide, and, from a homocentric
perspective, the question of sacrificing for animals does
not even arise.
The defense of nonhuman life must take place in
a different dimension of argument. It must be seen that
the disrelational self, that is, the homocentrist
, is in-
capable of holding to an ethic toward the environment.
If there is to be an environmental ethic in which nonhu-
mans have moral standing, then there must be a relational
quality of the self that is capable of desiring the well-
being of human and nonhuman alike. This question of a
relational self therefore deserves closer scrutiny, but
this time the anthropocentri sm which pervaded the Aris-
totelian model must be excised from the picture. Although
anthropocentrism cannot be entirely shed from consciousness,
a model is available for an ethic which does not feature
human-centeredness
.
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The ecocentric relational self
At this point, the problem of environmental ethics
is clear. The di srelational self constitutes a homocentric
society which not only lacks but is logically unable to
develop an ecological morality. On the fringes of the
social spectrum there are some people who practice a com-
munal morality which takes animals into account. Such
people will go to great lengths to save animals, often at
great cost to themselves. Yet, according to our western
intellectual tradition we should all be homocentrists
.
Relational morality does not fit with our time. Homocen-
trists are busy extinguishing large numbers of species.
Ecocentrists are busy saving as many individuals of various
species as they can. But this contradiction cannot continue
indefinitely. What is at stake here is not only the lives
of animals, but also the nature of human life. If the
homocentrist prevails, then all moral consciousness will
be erased and people will seek the means of survival with-
out thought of the "quality" of what they seek to secure.
Although relational moral action had a basis in
ancient theory, its dependence in theory on the closed social
systems of early civilizations sealed its fate. In the
centuries of abundance, there was little thought about
eradication of nature because it seemed quite impossible.
In the new condition of scarcity, the nature of human
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destructiveness has struck a chord in the sensibilities
of a minority in many different countries. It now
appears that relational thinking has sprung up once again,
in a new form, promising a new kind of praxis or moral
action
In the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer there is a central
concern with the Greek concept of phronisis, "intellectual
virtue," the basis for "ethical know-how. "^^ Gadamer
insists that even in the midst of the most corrupt society
there can be phronisis
,
as we see in the examples of
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (among others one supposes).
Yet there is a certain conceptual distortion here, because
the word "corrupt" does not capture any essential nature
of a society, not even one "gone bad." Corruption suggests
a good society with bad elements in it, and by "good soci-
ety" can be meant a social foundation for that very
phronisis
.
The problem of homocentric society is radically
different
.
Homocentrism cannot be characterized in the value-
laden terms of anthropos . Its description concerns the
total absence of moral thinking— the neutralization of
moral ideas. (This phenomenon does not conflict with any
self -description within that society as "religious" or
"moral," but, paradoxically, the two phenomena go hand in
hand.) The appearance of relational thought and action
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in the midst of homocentrism is directly related to the
greatest single catastrophe of our age: the destruction
of wild nature. With this description of self and world
interconnected, the argument and interrogation continues,
forcing to the surface the little discussed aspect of
rational thought in its moral bearing, that the nature of
the self is the nature of its world. Hence, the self can-
not overlay on its social relations an ethic fundamentally
in conflict with its own social being.
Summary
This chapter examined the ill-founded logic of
species preservation, the logic of animal rights, reflecting
its homocentric foundations. In contrast, the concept of
a social basis for ecocentrism was begun. This task con-
tinues in chapter three.
The way is now clear for a further explanation of
the problem of an ecocentric consciousness. It can be
stated simply. Aldo Leopold's fame as an environmental
philosopher stems from his work on the concept of a land
ethic. In one of the most quoted passages from his work,
he spells out the sense of such a standpoint. The formu-
lation is that
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integ-
rity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.
It is wrong when it tends otherwi se . -^2
The problem is that a homocentric consciousness
would not see this ethic to be a rational approach to
its own welfare, and would not, therefore, perceive the
"inner truth" of this view. The view itself is not a
simple, rational formulation of a position that any
neutral investigator would come to see as a sound and
well-founded idea of the best arrangement for any social
version of reality. At the same time, it is not a simpl
normative viewpoint. Instead, the formulation reflects
an ecocentric vision which in turn is an adherence to
principles that themselves shape consciousness. If these
principles of ecological thinking are at all "normative,
they are so only in the sense that the self incorporates
these principles as its standpoint.
The concept of an ethic in terms of the triad, a
principle of selfhood as a moral ideal, is clearly prob-
lematic. The difficulties are examined in chapter three
The argument and interrogation proceed dialecti cal ly
,
developing further the concept of a land ethic, a basis
for a sustainable society.
CHAPTER III
UNIFYING THE BIFURCATION
Does Humanity Need Wild Nature?
When Durkheim proposed a conceptual split between
society and nature, the bifurcation was already a well
established psychological fact. Wild nature had become
totally alien. This phenomenon in which society tried
to escape its origins in nature by making it wholly other
is the central phenomenon of this study. Wild nature has
been understood here to refer to the macroworld of the
larger animals and plants; homocentrism was shown to be
a modern society-centered consciousness cut off from other
aspects of the living world, producing a bifurcation which
leaves society unable to depict the exact sense of nature
to which animals belong. "^'^
The moral significance of the bifurcation was a
focal point in chapter one. Here that inquiry continues
in a more detailed form. Following the practice of the
previous chapter, the development of a land ethic in
modern society is used here to contrast with the bifur-
cated consciousness. Accordingly, it will be fruitful
to make use of a passage in John Stuart Mill that is
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uncharacteristic of Mill's thought. Nonetheless, its
bearing on the moral significance of the bifurcation
startling. Mill is reflecting in this passage on an
imagined world in which "... nothing [is] left to the
spontaneous activity of nature
. .
."^^ Mill despaired
of a world in which "... every rood of land [is] brought
into cultivation
.
. . which is capable of growing food
for human beings
. . in which one finds
.
.
.every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed
up, all quadrapeds or birds which are not domesticatedfor man's use exterminated as his rivals for food,
every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and
scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower
could grow without being eradicated as a weed in
the name of improved agriculture.
. .
Such a world "... without natural beauty and grandeur
3 7
... IS not good for man." Mill adds that wild nature
"... is the cradle of thoughts and aspirations which
are not only good for the individual, but which society
o o
could ill do without."
Is Mill right? Is this sort of world, or one even
further removed from Mill's vision, a world that is "not
good for man"? For if it is good, if humans can survive
in such a world, then there is no strong case to be made
against homocentri sm . The claims of some who find our
transformation of wild places and the destruction of non-
human items morally abhorrent would come to little or
nothing. Is Mill's description of nature as "a cradle
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of thoughts and aspirations" a persuasive picture concern-
ing how a humane life is possible? The humane life is
surely Mill's meaning. is most important to note
that Mill's nightmare suggests a course of events in
which the imagery of the bifurcated consciousness becomes
a permanent reality.
We can picture this course of events. First,
strip away the forests, plow the resulting meadows, and
plant crops. The next step is to build towns. But prog-
ress prevents a static condition. Towns spread and farm-
land is then threatened with extinction. Such a course
of events is a manifestation of the bifurcated conscious-
ness. The mind of homocentrism is inclined to mold its
world forever to the image of the molder. The ultimate
point is to realize the molded and the molder as one.
that is, a progressively more built environment is the
only course of action; every rood of land is ultimately
replaced by another fabricated item in an unceasing process
Wild nature, in Mill's description of it, disappears.
Preservationists may continue to resist the unceasing
process, but just as old architecture is constantly being
replaced by newer creations, so also the transfiguration
by homocentrism begins to look like Mill's picture in which
even small "nature" preserves seem destined for change
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Homocentrists reply that society can incorporate
nature, can build parks for the respite of those who weary
of concrete, and can set aside some flowery wastes so that
nature is not forgotton. There is a limit, they would say,
beyond which wild nature gets in the way of the great enter-
prise. The path back to nature is sentimental, the claim
goes. Those who manifest a wish to return to more natural
surroundings exhibit a pastoral impulse. A "pastoral
impulse," Leo Marx explains, is an "urge, in the face of
society's increasing power and complexity, to retreat in
the direction of nature. "^° It is an impulse to retreat
to a landscape that "bears fewer of the marks of human
41intervention." Looked upon as an escape from the delib-
erately planned, the impulse would seem to give rise to a
"nature" at once fertile, unpredictable, vital and mysteri-
ous, as many writers have suggested. Such writing should
be approached with caution. The dichotomizing of "human"
and "nature" subtly leads one to believe that there is
but one way to interact with wild nature, an idea as
preposterous as homocentric thought itself. Environmental-
ists who accept (or subscribe to) mutterings about "nature,"
fully contribute to a rationality that tries (with great
effectiveness) to stiffle the idea that thought and action
are implicated in wild nature's being.
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What homocentrists have gained is a world in which
society accepts plastic trees, because rationality has
been transformed to make indiscernible any fundamental
difference between the "natural" and the artificial,
especially if they have the "same" utility value. Mill
seems to have had in mind a less drastic revision of
nature than what we already have. Our improvements include
"improved" agriculture, but even our improved agriculture
gives way to malls and hamburger strips.
Mill stated that the absence of wild nature is not
good for any human. Presumably, what Mill meant by "not
good" was that some image of what it is to be human would
be lost if all wild nature disappeared. By "not good for
man" he implied that all men and women are alike in sharing
one humanity. If Mill was wrong on this point, there
could come a time when the total absence of wild nature is
perfectly good for people. Using this passage from Mill
helps to bring out the thesis that, for a certain type of
humanity, the absence of wild nature is perfectly good.
Mill's implicit assumption that all humanity is
alike flatly contradicts the bifurcation thesis. But he
contradicts it in a fruitful way. For example, his norma-
tive vision of human life— the cradle of thoughts and
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aspirations-is in direct violation of tenets dearly
held by .any pos t-.oderns
.
Note that "direct violation"
is not the same as "direct conflict"; Mill is not in con-
flict with instrumental views of nature. He is making a
statement about the nature of "man," not one about the
uses of nature; although one can imply the other, Mill
can be read (here) to mean that a ruthless attitude toward
wild nature is inconsistent with his view of humanity.
The idea of humanity as nurtured by contact with
wild nature involves some subtleties. The suggestion of
interaction, a mixing of spirit and substance, of sense
and essence, is profoundly lost on many moderns who see
nature in terms that are shockingly simplistic. For
example, William Baxter says
I reject the proposition that we ought to respect
the 'balance of nature' or to ' preserve the envi-
ronment' unless the reason for doing so, express
or implied, is the benefit of man. ^5
The assumptions about man and nature are so un-
conscious that a notion such as respect for ecological
balance is believed to take place in an intellectual vacuum
apart from lived experience. But if it is a lived ex-
perience that leads to respect for ecological balance,
then how would this respect not be beneficial to the one
who is respectful? As for the "benefit of man," one
must wonder what benefits are being valued.
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These conceptual confusions are bred by valuations
that the valuer would rather not make clear. These con-
fusions have by turns led to a complete loss of public
understanding about the meaning of environmental i sm . Some
further confus ions—enbedded in homocentric rationality-
should be explored to help further the line of development
toward a concept of ecocentric, relational thought.
Human chauvinism
Human chauvinism is taken to be analogous to forms
of social discrimination, albeit here it is descrimination
between humans and nonhumans
. Richard and Val Routley in
a critique of human chauvinism^^ believe human chauvinism
to be the problem resonsible for the situation in which
animals are excluded from value and morality. Nonhuman
life has "... value or [creates] constraints on human
action only insofar as these items serve human interests
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or purposes." This is the definition of human chauvinism
in its strong sense. It tells us that virtually all humans
have a strong preference for their own interests where such
interests may conflict v^zith the interests of animals. A
similar view is taken by Richard Ryder^'^ and Peter Singer.
Ryder coined the term "speciesism" to document what he
takes to be " . . . the belief that we are entitled to
treat members of other species in a way in which it would
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be wrong to treat mernbers of our own species. Like
human chauvinism, speciesisrn purportedly explains why
in many contexts, from trapping fur bearing animals to
laboratory experimentation to the poisoning of predators
we discriminate against animals. Singer uses the
because he has in mind an "animal liberation," which
an unabashedly social analogy.
We have, if we join these philosophers, moved
imperceptibly from Mill's version of why humans need nature
to a position in which other species are spoken about as
if they shared the social world with humans but are merely
discriminated against. Singer, defending the analogy
between racism and speciesism, helps to radically shift the
meaning of the debate.
The non-racist would do well to bear the analogy in
mind when he is inclined to defend human behavior
toward nonhumans
.
'Shouldn't we worry about improving
the lot of our own species before we concern ourselves
with other species?' he may ask. If we substitute
race' for 'species' we shall see that the question
is better not asked. ^0
The temptation to accept social analogies is easy to under-
stand and superficially compelling. Yet, the problem with
both speciesism and human chauvinsim as labels is that we
are hard put to name their opposites. What is the opposite
of a human chauvinist? Somehow the Routleys and Singer
have managed to puzzle us by implying that human chauvinism
and speciesism are escapable in a philosophically cogent
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way. Stated as a discursive argument, the best outcome
such philosophers can hope for is to persuade others to
their view. This approach see.s to profoundly undermine
the true nature of the environmental problem.
Far more explanatory of our actual situation is to
say that we are cut off from a certain consciousness of
wild nature, rather than to employ the rhetoric of egali-
tarianism. What, after all, is the moral stance to be
taken once the case against human chauvinism is made?
The term "chauvinsim ,
" like "speciesi sm , " while
intelligible as social analogy, does not in fact guide
us to an ethic that is ecologically sound, nor do these
terms suggest a systematic approach for changing behavior.
The real complaint, of course, is against a purely discursive
ethic, some "environmental ethic" based on ideas deriving
from homocentric consciousness. Arguments for preserva-
tion or "humaneness" grounded in the homocentrist
'
s
rationality lead to just the unwanted result.
The preservationist who seeks to save various
species by using instrumental language, the very language
which obscures the self's relation to the land and hence
to wild habitat, disassociates wildlife from humanity.
In doing so, such preservationists destroy the whole point
of preservation while also ensuring that huge quantities
of life will die. This point can be illustrated by a
:ion
brief look at Paul and Anne Ehrllch's book Extinct
Their argument looks like this. Stripping away nature
may not be good for hu.ans because of what the Ehrlichs
describe as "rivet popping. "51
^^^^.^^^
popping rivets is the destruction of species. The sense
of the metaphor is that spaceship earth cannot fly safely
If we "pop," i.e., destroy, those elements which hold the
craft together. We never know when we will kill off one
crucial species, the absence of which will destroy the
spaceship
.
The rivet-popping argument is not persuasive.
The homocentric human is already engaged in numerous harm-
ful practices such as the dumping of radioactive wastes
into the oceans; the thought that it is possibly dangerous
to kill off species fails to impress the decision-makers.
In any case, the rivet-popping analogy hardly functions
as it was intended, namely to save wildlife from extinction
This could only be done by finding a powerful argument that
would go some way to prevent the killing of individuals of
a species. The rivet-popping argument only tells us that
we may be in for trouble if we continue to pop rivets. It
does not tell us that it is not in our interests to kill
individual nonhumans
.
It fact, many benefits accrue from
the kill ing of individual animals of numerous species,
but the dividing line between individuals and the whole
of the species is only found when the species become
"endangered"; then each individual begins to count. Homo-
centrists will never notice that more and more rivets are
missing. Nothing short of an unmitigated disaster could
convince them that all along something was going wrong.
Reading the Ehrlichs' book, one has the feeling
that they want to say something less egocentric than they
actually do say.^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ precautions
to prevent the popping of crucial rivets. They seem to
want to say that we moderns should stop the carnage now.
But they fear a reply that the short term benefits outweigh
the long term possibility of ecological damage. Therefore
they try to appeal to the egoist's self-interest, but ac-
tually they undo their own position. The homocentrist can
say that although it is probable that some untoward events
will be the result of a catastrophe visited upon diverse
species, it is hard to foretell exactly what these will
be. The Ehrlichs are careful not to be too specific about
the exact consequences for us of mass extinction, yet they
strongly imply the threat to human viability. The argument,
placed on such empirical conditions, only makes it more
likely that one species after another will disappear.
Instrumental reasons for saving species are futile.
Anything short of the destruction of the "spacecraft"
would leave instrumental reason intact. In fact, instru-
.
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mental reason has a tendency to show the benefits of
extirpating wild nature, e.g., the destruction of habitat
to make way for crops or development. Certainly poachers
of wild nature, e.g., ivory hunters, will not be convinced
by instrumental reasons.
On the institutional level, instrumental reason,
such as cost-benefit analysis, is required because public
policy is based on the concept of rationality— society
'
s
current notion of reason. Due to such analyses, benefits
tend to be analyzed on the same level of immediacy as the
calculations of poachers. Even in the "enlightened"
countries, environmental considerations are the result of
compromise between short term gains and calculations about
the long term environmental effect. All who subscribe to
the rationality that regulates the flow of commodities
unwittingly subscribe to the extinction of species, and
certainly to inhumane slaughter.
The point has now been illustrated that homocentric
consciousness, in all of its modes of reasoning, e.g.,
human chauvinism or instrumentalism
, leads to the extinction
of species. It was argued that no purely discursive
reasoning will work to save wild nature.
One further analysis (or interrogation) of the
homocentric predicament remains to be made. The theme
here is a curious parallel to the extinction problem;
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it is the question of hu.an survival. Since it has beco.e
commonplace to observe that humanity may not prevail, ^3
many writers deal with the issue as if it were an either/or
issue. Either we change or we will not survive. This
view has been met by the counter argument that (for various
reasons) humanity may very well survive, and that fears
of our imminent demise have been exaggerated. In this
guise, the whole debate has grown stale. More important,
the issues are treated in terms of homocentric rationality.
The questioning can begin here.
Future generations
In his paper "Do We Owe the Future Anything?"
Richard T. DeGeorge exhibits a paradigmatic example of
the homocentric view of future generation. What is
especially clear is that DeGeorge cannot be called a human
chauvinist. His argument is this.
Only existing entities have rights.
Nonexistent entities by defintion do not exist.
What does not exist cannot be the subiect or bearer
of rights. 5^
DeGeorge is especially concerned to argue that it is to
distant future generations that we owe no duties since
these nonexistents have no claim. He is not conerned to
argue that parents have no obligations to their yet unborn
children. What is wrong with this position?
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First let us ask if "rights" at-pi nc re the proper subject
of his inquiry. The argument is:
Consider the general attitude towards the ancient
therh/""" ^^^y anything' Sid
clelr tut.T^ obligations to us? ^It isa hat there are no sanctions we can imnose onthem and no way we can enforce any obuL^Tons wpmay claim they had toward us. But surelv evpnra.se the question of their obligationl^ ur?s'odd.55
What is odd is the "us." Did the Greeks, any ancient
Greeks, have us in mind? While they could not picture
even modern Greek peoples, they could and did have control
over the destiny of the land. The question is not about
future peoples, but rather about the world future peoples
will inherit. DeGeorge makes the question sound odd.
But surely it is wrong to claim that the environment belongs
only to the living, that future generations will be out of
luck. It is perfectly possible to blame earlier genera-
tions for leaving a barren wasteland of desert conditions.
Future generations are not so much unborn as they are part
of a future that has not yet come to pass. We present
generations are responsible to the future, that is, we
ought not prevent it from coming to pass.
Although we cannot conceive of the distant future,
our thoughts are to the next generation and theirs to the
next after them. It is fallacious to argue that we have
no obligations to distant future peoples since we have
a clear prima facie obligation to the next generation,
are a
.e
.
as
and so on. The question, then, never concerned rights and
duties but has always concerned interests. Future genera-
tions have, by definition, a future interest in co.ing to
be. They have as well future interests that they will
inherit an unspoiled world. If future interests
consideration, we owe the future everything possibL
Homocentrists, however, have no ties to the future,
DeGeorge illustrates. Only the mutual obligations of the
living remain, since not meeting an obligation to a living
person could have unpleasant consequences, but not meeting
an obligation to "the future" does not incur any unpleasant
consequences.
DeGeorge establishes that to owe someone something
means that someone else has a consequent right to receive
it. This sort of obligation is contractual; it is a
legalistic morality. Obligations to one's own children
can be of this sort, although the legalistic character of
obligations to grandchildren becomes somewhat tenuous.
Such obligation dissipates over time; one's own great-
grandchildren are no longer the recipients of an obligation.
In this sense DeGeorge is right; we owe nothing to the
future. This, however, raises a pressing question. If
there is no contractual obligation to the distant future,
is there no moral obligation of any kind from one generation
to the next?
Yet, if there is only legalistic morality, it Is
hard to see how a moral continuity can come about' DeGeorg
says that we do have obligations to our own children, but
not to the indefinite future. His confusion stems from
a mistake about the meaning of an obligation in an "environ
mental" context. Obligation does not mean that by doing X
a person A fulfills his/her obligation. Its moral meaning
is discovered rather in a relational mode of apprehending.
The question, then, is about our relation to the future.
Legally we have no relation to the future. Therefore moral
continuity does not depend on what we are obligated to do,
but on what we want to do as a matter of self-definition.
The transfer of this definition is bound up with moral con-
tinuity. An environmental ethic is incoherent if each gen-
eration has to begin anew. The protection of wild nature
depends on moral continuity if our self-definition is
bound up with that nature. The case against homocentrism
lies with a strong defense of a land ethic which requires
just this moral continuity.
In the next section the argument will proceed by
critique, at the end of which it will be possible to
defend the thesis concerning moral continuity. For now,
the task is to lay bare the mind that makes plausible the
neutralization of consciousness discussed in the first
chapter
.
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Moral Continuifvr ^^h^^c^ f .^^
Environmental (^^nnt^vf
The argument, which has taken several forms-obs
vation, analysis, and contrast-has been directed against
the discursive reasoning of certain
"environmentalists"
who exhibit the consciousness of homocentrism as much as
others who share thac human feature. The immediate task
ahead is to take the argument further, to inquire in more
depth about homocentric thought.
One aspect of homocentric thought too interesting
to pass over is its very own critique of environmentalism
.
In the advanced societies, the mention of the word
"environmentalist" conjures up thoughts of people who
reject all the hard work of generations to deliver to
the ordinary person the goods and benefits once enjoyed
only by the rich. Environmentalism is associated with
privilege and also selfishness. Mark Sagoff makes this
point
.
If we took Locke to Ocean City, moreover, what would
he see? Would he see a lot of people starving while
a privileged few eat salmon and drink Chateau Margaux?
No. Locke would see just about everyone lined up
for steamed crabs, ice cream, and beer. Not bad
—
for $3.95. To show Locke Ocean City is not to
present to him the horrors of social inequality.
It is to show him the horrors of social equality.
Schlock on every block. K-Mart lowers the price.
Who can complain when $250 on the used car market
buys an eight-cylinder four-on-the floor '73 Impala
with mags and stripes? It goes from 0 to 80 in ten
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iTuToMir- so°wh:r?f''? ^^^^^ "-^^^ ^vccs
might point out thafi' i, "^<^^=.^ muffler? Locke
baftloL of beau y'on he East^Jnlhn^.''^' It"of the rich. There are a 1o? ^hore are the estates
to redistribute wealt"ln%hfunUen:i es' hfr°"^
Pun?i rj^^^i-th-
-^e-f-h^ o r ?S
caT^he^h:[[t"h^?.-^:ho^-r.r:i?-^^^
The derision expressed here toward "environmental
quality" sharply puts in focus the absurd idea floating
around in homocentric society that the environmental
question can be expressed in the rhetoric of democratic
equality-that, since the notion is a matter of opinion,
it can be subject to the wants and desires of all. But,
of course, the notion is a farcical one—something like
beautification—a product of a peculiar rationality. In
spite of this "straw man" issue, environmentalists are
subject to ridicule for wanting a beautiful, healthful
environment at almost everyone else's expense.
The unself-conscious confusion is nearly total.
Indeed, many environmentalists accept the version of
their project attributed to them by the larger society.
The homocentric version of environmentalism comes to
little more than a choice of social goods for consumers.
The ideology of choice serves homocentric consciousness
well, especially because its one-dimensional understanding
portrays a problem that is easy to grasp.
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Homocentrism also gets philosophical service
from its intellectual workers. They can help to legiti-
naate a society cut off from nature. They might point out
that human chauvinism is not entirely escapable and they
will take this to mean that we can only make social con-
tracts and not contracts with nature. They will argue
that environmentalists confuse sentiment with morality
when wild nature is the object in question. Let us see
if they are right about the view that we have certain
limited obligations to society and nothing more. They
would say
, after all
,
Morality is fundamentally a matter of self interest
modified only by such agreements constraining short-term self interested activity as may be in theinterests of agents to make.'^^
The idea of moral continuity makes no sense under this
definition of morality; since there could be no point to
moral continuity in an atomistic world, its logic does
not fit with the logic of the bifurcation. Thus the words
"morality" and "sentiment" have different meanings for
homocentrists than for others who are not caught up in
this perception of the world. It was cautioned in
chapter one that one ought not to refer to "environmental-
ists" since some make assumptions fully consistent with
homocentrism
.
So the statement about the limits of a
contract is tautological with respect to homocentrism
and absurd with respect to ecocentrism.
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There are countless examples of rational-discursive
argument concerning nature, environment, and human society
that lead to just this kind of absurd conclusion and puzzle-
ment. By now the reason should be apparent. The forms of
rationality suitable for a commodity orientation, including,
on the one hand, the objectivism called for by the guardians
of official knowledge, and, on the other, the tyranny of
value-relativism, are absurd for ecological thinking.
When some philosophers discuss the problems of
extinction or of cruelty to animals in the discourse of
homocentrism, one gets an uneasy feeling that something
fundamental has gone wrong. For although the discussion
seems logical, the character of the discourse seems somehow
bizarre. In light of the relational idea of morality and
its connection with the nature of selfhood— the whole point
of a preservationist approach to exi stence— the following
fragment seems as pointless as it seems ludicrous.
While there may be a loose sense of the term in which
we can say that it is in the interests of a tree to
be watered, this attenuated sense of the term is not
the sense covered by the principle of equal considera-
tion of interests. All we mean when we say that it is
in the interests of a tree to be watered is that the
tree needs water if it is to continue to live and grow
normally; if we regard this as evidence that the tree
has interests, we might almost as well say that it is
in the interests of a car to be lubricated regularly
because the car needs lubrication if it is to run
properly. In neither case can we really mean (unless
we impute consciousness to trees or cars) that the
tree or car has any preference about the matter.
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When Mill said that the disappearance of wild nature
is not good for humans, he meant something more than his
own utilitarianism would hint at. Although living forms,
and even nonliving ones, are integral parts of a living
system which includes humans. Mill does not mean that human
survival depends on keeping these forms intact. He seems
to mean that we can radically transform nature and still
survive, but that we could not retain quite the same nature.
Yet Mill's reflection is but an unargued claim about the
sense of human being. For our contemporaries, however,
this claim seems much less arguable that it would have been
for Mill; otherwise it seems strange that there should be
environmentalists at all. The only conclusion is that for
a certain human society the well-being of wild nature is
alien to its sel f
-understanding
, and hence antithetical to
Mill's version of humanity. By this route, the thesis has
been demonstrated that moral continuity depends on a capac-
ity to participate (in the Platonic sense) in the nonhuman
world, gaining thereby a form of knowledge that is indis-
tinguishable from moral understanding.
Moral continuity, as we can now see, depends on
a continuity in consciousness from one human to the next
and from one generation to the next. That continuity
comes through participation. This should be noted care-
fully. Participation, if looked at through strictly social
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eyes, would be sheer mystery. It involves a knowledge
of one's own transitory nature in relation to a wider
consciousness.
Many thinkers have thought that advanced industrial
society necessarily precludes this form of consciousness,
and that the self
-understanding here called "homocentrism"
is an unavoidable outcome of history and culture. If it
were, there would be no possibility of a widespread ecocen-
trism because it would be illogical and almost inconceiv-
able. However, it is homocentrism that is illogical, and
some think that its future is nearly inconceivable. On the
grounds that ecocentric relational being is both logical
and desirable because it has the capacity to sustain life
indefinitely the argument continues.
A land ethic
Ecocentrism means to heal the homocentric bifurca-
tion. The moral implications of this unifying effort have
been drawn out. Land is the central notion in the relation
between ecocentrists and wild nature. For them, land has
the meaning of a relational quality which cannot be found
in typical human relations of moral obligation. It is a
distinct type of relation. The explanation for it goes
like this.
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Like Aide Leopold's land ethic, the present version
takes land to ''enlarge the boundaries of the co..unity to
include soils, waters, plants, and ani.als, or collectively:
the land. This enlargement of the community idea is
the basis for moral continuity between generations. A land
ethic is best understood in terms of this enlargement of
boundaries. In a word, the land ethic is an ecological
ethic. The kind of human benefit to be derived from it is
so intertwined with a form of life that one is hard put to
speak of particular benefits. It is, however, just this
form of human good which is intertwined with the good of
other species. By speaking as though the self was the
object of the environmental quest, by developing a language
for the relational self, other species benefit in the long
run
.
Ecocentric philosophy is a philosophy of ecological
ends, not merely of social means. When the idea of species
preservation is legislated in homocentric society, the
result is likely to look like this. John Rodman tell us
that
.
. .
it becomes evident that the preoccupation with
saving species from extinction can become an absolute
abstracted from the larger and more complex issue of
defending a habitat that is shared by humans and non-
humans alike. To assume automatically that either
snail darters or human beings can be artificially
transplanted from one locale to another without
being significantly changed presupposes a remarkably
atomistic view of the world. Where this leads is
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shown by the proposal to 'save' the r=.nf„ •
condor by breeding U In captlvltytsS^
The atomistic Ideal Is clearly Integral to homo-
centric thought. Clearly ecocentrlc thought Is based on
ecological ideas in both the moral and rational sense
Chat sustains an economy of nature and a social economy
of conservation. Its metaphor is the ecological system
which
•
•
.performs a function which contributes to theoverall flow of materials, services, and energywithm the system. Plants, while nourishing them-selves on air, water, and minerals fix solar energy
on a form utilizable by some animals. They alsoproduce free oxygen as a by-product
. Grazing animals,
as they feed directly on plants, begin the process of
recycling plant nutrients, restoring carbon dioxideto the air, and minerals to the soil, a process
completed by worms and bacteria. In general, eachthing has a certain role or function in the natural
economy to which it becomes adapted; and ecologists
speak of producers
,
consumers, decomposers
, and fit
each to its 'niche' in the ecosystem.
To speak of these components of an ecosystem as
having moral standing is, paradoxically, to reflect the
rationality productive of moral neutralization. The
rationality being developed here is a new basis for moral
politics. Aristotle's theory demonstrates a version of
morally integrated thought and action; but it could not
serve as a model. Undoing homocentric reason brings one
to realize that self and reason are bound up with the
timeless mute world.
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Summary
Clearly moral-rational thought, as it emerges in
ecocentrism, is a far more encompassing characteristic than
traditional notions of an ethic. Numerous writers have
mentioned the idea of an integrated social consciousness
involving interconnections between ecology, economy, (soft)
technology, and an appropriate socio-polity
. Its contrast
with the minimal political participation in America is
obvious. Yet nothing less than a restructuring of con-
sciousness would produce people and institutions that
worked in harmony, cooperation, and trust. The steps taken
here to understand ecocentric selfhood represent a break
with conventional thinking. The contribution in these
pages has to go beyond prescription to a theory of ration-
ality, an integration of mind and environment.
The present work avoids prescriptive social theory;
it does not suggest an ideal toward which industrial so-
ciety ought to aim. Instead it is a working out of a
theory necessary to define what millions of people globally
have sought to express, especially in their actions. Rea-
son, self, and moral meaning have been understood to be
integrated in a conception of being that entails the world
of wild nature. Because these three components are taken
to be separate and distinct in homocentric society, they
produce epistemic, moral, and social problems.
CHAPTER IV
DECONSTRUCTING HOMOCENTRIC POLITICS
Politics, Persons, and Worlds
Facing the realities of a growing world population,
many writers have raised the issue of food and land use.
Feeding the human world increasingly comes at the expense
of wildlife habitat. It is now possible to foresee a
crowded world where every acre of land will be used for
improved agriculture, for human dwellings, or for commerce.
We can see a world in which human survival will be the
only consideration. Homocentric environmental issues mean
food, energy, and resources for a weary world. The idea
of land left relatively untouched will seem absurd. Re-
source conscious writers would think Mill's fears quaint
in the light of the new realities. They speak of space-
ship earth as having first and fourth class accomodations,
with the third world countries riding in fourth class
while countries like the United States have first class
seats. Given the realities of starvation and overpopula-
tion, and given the specter of world disorder and the
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possibility of nuclear holocaust, can we really take seri-
ously the environmentalists who continue to sound Mill's
fears? We answer yes, since these very problems are the
outcome of a homocentric way of life.
Ecocentric politics focuses primarily on society
as a community of man and nature; it sees in community the
principles of a sustainable society. So foreign are eco-
centric ideals to the dominant bifurcated version of society
that ecocentrism appears to be almost unintelligible. Its
purpose of transforming society to a sustainable type makes
ecocentrism a moral politics, but one not much in keeping
with the business of cost-benefit analysis. Communities
in conjunction with wild species are what need to be sus-
tained, according to ecocentrism.
The dominant consciousness maintains a politics
which displaces ecocentric content about wild nature with
concerns that are wholly external to the self. Hence we
find an emphasis on health rather than, say, well-being,
or an emphasis on amenities rather than the presevation
of wild places. Homocentric environmentalism is not mys-
terious; it is about external things. An amenity is an
external thing, for example, a recreational facility, or
perhaps an overcrowded park like Yellowstone. Homocentric
environmental politics also concerns piecemeal planning,
for it has no vision.
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Ecocentrists declare that their way of life is
based on environmental viability. Espousing the view that
a society should be based on ecologically sound principles
of homeostasis, the ecocentrist is not concerned simply
with some segment of experience known as an environmental
concern; all of ecocentric experience is environmental.
It is therefore difficult to express ecocentric ideals in
the homocentric language of externality.
It is not hard to express steady state principles
as such. Political ecologists who will be prominent in
this chapter have already stated these principles. More
elusive is the moral-political principle which could bring
about a steady state sustainable society. Politics in the
tradition of Hobbes and Adam Smith has focused on the con-
tent of a contractual social scheme.
It will be argued here that since the narrowed
consciousness of people who have come to understand social
reality to be the arrangements necessary to procure their
needs and wants cannot conceive of another kind of politics,
and since the dominant reality is the reality that centers
on these various wants and needs, the idea of political
reality has degenerated into modes of power in pursuit of
wants. No wonder, then, that corporate power has molded
the wants and desires of the masses to suit its own desires,
since this practice conforms to the spirit and letter of
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politics in the advanced countries. There can be no doubt
that an underlying purpose in the commodity society is the
production of commodity-oriented participants. Such a
purpose is consistent with the great traditions of politics
in the West. Specifically, politics has been at once a
pursuit of ends and the shaper of the political mind, the
one in pursuit of ends. It is a closed loop. The differ-
ence with ecocentric politics is a difference in the vision
of the self (the pursuer) and of the ends to be pursued.
That most normative term, the "person," is a politi-
cal term. In the tradition of the social contract, the
ideal has been the creation of a "citizen" rather than a
"person" in a form consistent with, say, philosophical
"Subjectivism," in which the person is a locus of value
and meaning (and perhaps truth). Consider a statement by
Christian Bay, a contemporary political theorist.
The particular harm that a century of liberalism
has accomplished—to be sure along with some progressive
achievements—has been to trap much of the human spirit
of emancipation within the false imagery of individual-
istic pursuit of happiness and civil liberties. Liber-
als have persistently tended to cut the citizen off
from the person; and they have placed on their human-
istic pedestal a cripple of a man, a man without a
moral or political nature; a man with plenty of con-
tractual rights and obligations, perhaps, but a man
without moorings in any real community; a drifter
rather than a being with roots in species solidarity.
Liberalism, in short, for all the comparative advantages
for the better-off in liberal societies (in contrast
to feudal, fascist, or military-ruled or even allegedly
socialist societies), has drastically impoverished our
appreciation of man's nature and potentialities.""^
The remarkable simiLarity between Mill's reflection
and this one resides in their implicit normative politics.
They both assume, without argument, a vision of human na-
ture. Liberal politics in the contract tradition has
claimed to produce a public citizen and a private person.
Bay's complaint is really about reduction of the private
person to the most trivial sort or subjectivism. Other
theorists have complained that the citizen too has been
reduced to the trivia of the political and economic market
place .
It was argued that the bifurcation has created the
decline of the human subject to the human object. The
quest for the "person" or the moral nature of human self-
hood reflects this condition of objectif ication . But poli-
tics is complicated, and so the quest is confused with other
issues and problems of human needs.
The connection between self and world, and hence
between moral ideals and politics, has been drawn out in
contrast to homocentric rationality. Problems of natural
resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and the con-
tinuing destruction of wild nature all precipitated a
literature of a political ecology in which the political
dispute takes curious turns, many of which implicate the
clash between ecocentrism and homocentri sm . These twists
and turns will be traced in order to understand the diffi-
Ill
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cuUles presented to ecocentrlsm by the confusions of homo-
centrism.
The political ecology debate
Political ecology can be understood to be grounded
in ecocentric thought. If there is to be a sustainabl,
world, society and nature must be viewed holistically
Political ecologists are not, however, agreed on the
of politics under this name, and so the label has been
attached to several very different kinds of politics. The
problem is both conceptual and methodological. Some inter-
pretations of political ecology insistently turn ecology
back into economy.
Insisting that economy and ecology are the same
in subject matter and in their ramifications, Alexander
Cockburn and James Ridgeway write in a volume entitled
Political Ecology that:
A political ecology that does not regard as
central the fact of structural unemployment must be
rightly perceived as marginal or frivolous: a politi-
cal ecology that does not integrate such central
economic issues into its analysis and programs has
failed before it begins—a victim of the same tunnel
vision that has been the crippling limitation of
middle, class reform movements for the last few de-
cades .
We can forgive the difficulty many writers find in under-
standing the operation of the word "political" on the
H2
word "ecology... YeC It is hard to forgive the deliberate
misuse of this pairing to explain away ecology as political
economy so that there Is virtually nothing left of nature.
Awareness Is constantly brought to focus on social welfare
issues at the expense of the deeper Issue. We are left
with much politics and little ecology. Rldgeway and
Cockburn state that:
a\sefui^LVnrH°'' ^° .'P^lifi-^l ecology' has becomeuset l way of describing the intentions of radicalmovenients m the United States: the struggle againstthe adoption of nuclear power as a major part o? the
.r-T 7lt ^""^^^^ produced a vigorous activism
f
country (most notably in New Hampshire
, inthe ight of the Clamshell Alliance against the Sea-brook nuclear plant) very distant from thP original
rather sedate operation of the eco-loby.^^
To be sure, ecocentrists will have nothing to do with nu-
clear power. Still it is not a simple matter to find an
alternative source of energy while leaving the entire
economic and social structure in place. The implementa-
tion of solar power facilities is impossible without a
total alteration of society. Such genuine change, eco-
centrists believe, is only possible as a change in con-
sciousness. This is the project of a political ecology.
As our two writers have it, ecology, taken beyond
science, is a very vague notion which they are unable to
cl arify. "Ecology, now a word used so haphazardly that
it is useful more as a signpost than a definition, does
drag in its wake many of the more important social and
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political issues of the last decade. -66 What these writers
do not see is the bifurcation in consciousness which con-
fines most proponents of apparent radical social change to
homocentrism. An explanation for this tendency is that
their definition of politics remains a captive to the tra-
ditions that conspire against nature and a human relation
to it.
Grahame Beakhust in his paper "Political Ecology"
defends the thesis that "politics and ecology are intimately
linked in both theory and practice." Earlier he says
that "political ecology transcends and incorporates much
of political economy. "^^ There is something important in
this remark. A sustainable economy and equitable social
relations are crucial to the kind of fellowship and sen-
sitivity to wild nature characteristic of ecocentrism.
William Ophuls, in his Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity
,
also indicates the requirements of a sustainable society.
The basic political problem is the survival of the
community; two of the basic political tasks are the
provision of food and other biological necessities
and the establishment of conditions favorable for
reproduction. Neither of these can be accomplished
except in the human household provided by nature and
in this sense politics must rest on an ecological
foundation
.
It is necessary to look at these conceptions of the rela-
tion between politics and ecology for their theoretical
promise or lack of it. Because Ophuls appears to be
profoundly tied to homocentric rationality, he does not
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realize thaC the thrust of his Ideas makes their own
rational basis inappropriate. Seeming at times aware
of this, he tends to shift ground and make conflicting
claims about the nature of a political ecology. He thereby
has trouble reconciling versions of Western political
thought with the centralism of his book. For Instance,
he says
,
For Aristotle, as well as for Plato and other maiorpolitical theorists, 'politics' concerns thfs s^rCLleto live m the community on the earth, and it therf?
defined A?is?nT^ 't^'^P '^^'^^^ government narrowlyt . ristotle asks how this political animal candesign and create institutions that will assure thesurvival of the city of man and some measure of thegood life within it.^^
The problem Ophuls encounters is the lack of a
theory of ecological society, which certainly none of the
political philosophers provided, nor would they have under-
stood the concept. It was argued in chapter two that
Aristotle provided a concept of relational morality that
went a long way toward demonstrating why moral ideals must
be rooted in a whole way of life, furnished by a community
and its foundation in being. In a hierarchy of existence,
Aristotle's ontology, the patterns of becoming for all
forms of being required no further theory of society. It
should be understood that in Aristotelian philosophy the
human subject was understood in a larger picture of nature
as subject. With the disintegration of ontological founda-
tions for community, the basis for intellectual (rational)
and .oral virtue could no longer be understood. Ophuls'
proble. was to conceive a theory of self and society that
could supply a surrogate for such ontological foundations
that disappeared long ago. But Ophuls did not recognize
this problem and instead innocently stated the concept of
an ecosystem as a model for an ecological foundation. Of
course, this provides no motivational forces for any new
kinds of human behavior. Without this, however, there
could be no sustainable society.
Ophuls' uncertainty about how an ecological
foundation is supposed to guide politics is due to a
failure to clarify his depiction of nature. His opening
brief account of scientific ecology as a "web of natural
interdependency"71 does not lead systematically to his
politcs of the steady state.
Beakhust, similarly, moves without caution from •
ecology to economy to politics, thinking that the safest
route for a political ecology is to avoid the appearance
of saving "nature" as its objective. He fears the criti-
cism that political ecology may resemble a "new puritanism
which, in the guise of saving nature, thunders with irrevo-
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cable contempt for our species." His fear reflects the
bifurcation in consciousness which first separates the
hu.an social world fro. the world of other species and then
alleges that environmentalists, because they would save
other species, disdain their own. This is a standard ploy,
polarizing man and nature, the better to keep nature for-
ever al.ien. Political ecology theorists understand that
a socially tansformative idea is needed, but they have yet
to see that the well-being of wild nature is a key idea.
When they do, they will be able to show that environmental-
ists qua ecocenrists are not proponents of a nature which
subverts human purposes, as homocentrists charge.
The fear of homocentric criticism issues in a sense
of futility and constant up-hill battles for environmental
organizations as well as for environmental theorists. This
futility is at the heart of an environmentalist's dilemma,
for if an environmental organization like the Sierra Club
argues that their good is the good of society then they
are locked into a fruitless debate with other homocentrists
who see the good of society in strictly socio-economic
terms. The Sierrans may assert an interest in the "quality
of life," but they would be forced to capitulate to the
economic version of this nebulous idea, or they must show
how to reconcile the good of humanity with the preservation
of nature. Lacking such an explanation, the Sierrans and
others are destined to an interminable quest for an ill-
defined condition of life. As long as the thinking of
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political ecologists reniains within the homocentric orbit,
they perpetuate the dilemma of activists and all whose
intuitions tell them that something is terribly wrong.
Locked into the reasoning patterns that produce
a conflict between economy and ecology, political ecolo-
gists find only the thinnest of political prescriptions
for the attainment of their environmental image of the
good society. The debate has been fruitless, or productive
only of paradox. As Allaby and Bunyard say:
Environmental awareness has become the privilege ofthose who m modern terms are able to improve theirlot. Many sociologists, the late Anthony Croslandtor example, claimed that such awareness was primarily
a middle-class phenomenon and, as such, must be givenless weight in terms of politcal action than in rais-ing the_ standard of living of those presumably still
classified as working class and underprivileged. That
argument is somewhat circular since a polluted, un-pleasant environment can hardly be synonomous with ahigh standard of living; hence, if making a high stan-dard of living creates more pollution and environ-
mental degradation, the raising of the underprivileged
to a more satisfactory standard will be unattainable.'^-^
The methodological problem of disunity between
economy and ecology and in relation to psycho-social be-
haviors stems from the deeper problem of politics. Because
of the bifurcation, the concept of work, taken instrumental-
ly, follows from the concept of an economy independent of
ecology. A series of logical forces are set up that have
no interactive meanings
,
but generate outcomes serving as
conceptual was tes , and of course, material and ecological
tes
.
The waste of soil and the decline of soil healthwas
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on the giant farr.s follows this logic in its connection
with the concept of agribusiness. Wendel Berry puts it
well
.
.•^
^^^^
^^""^^ ^^^^ abusing our landin this way partly in order to correct ou? 'balanceof payments '-that is, in order to buy foreignpetroleum. In the language of some 'agribusiness'
experts we are using 'agri-dollars' to offset thedrain of petrodollars.' We are, in effect, exportingour topsoil m order to keep our tractors ^unning.M^
One needs to see the economic and social system
to which this logic is tied to see in turn the point of
diverting awareness from a human ideal of integrative
being: work, purpose, fellowship, and kinship with the
land to produce the "person" would be an ideal fully
subversive to the logic of fragmentation and the commodity
network
.
An enormous system of rationalization defends
against these charges. The defense is generally of the
sort that deals with bogus issues in the genre of "pro-
gress." One prominent Russian scientist makes this sort
of claim in the most extreme manner, showing thereby that
the nature of self and the self's relation to land, envi-
ronment, and moral understanding are nonexistent consider-
ations, but "efficiency" and "progress" are.
Do humans harm themselves by acting upon their natural
environment? Most of the ecologists are of the opinion
that this is exactly the case. I do not subscribe to
this view, for the following reason: if our ancestors
had turned the whole of our planet into a well-cared
for nature preserve about 300 to 500 years ago (when
U9
they began their massive onslaught on nature 1modern society would not be abll to ex?st
'
ho„.?— "f^^ speaking, the balance of nature Is
bHun^i: :n^%a?h^r^;;^1^:,^r^"'
only if tLlrnui^er7r:Lirinch:nged!^5^"
Later, he says,
proDiems tacmg it. The present trends of develoomentof science m general
,
and the earth science In oarticular, furnish enough proof that in future too allecological problems will be tackled. We wUl W
to
-design' 'and"''''^ ^-^nological capabulties
on. ^JrJ t ''''^^^^ environment necessary forur development,
. . .
This conviction backs up theoptimistic concept that human society will have trulyunlimited possibilities for progress^^b
Political ecology develops as a response to this kind of
thinking
.
The politics of homocentrism has been schematized
just in order to briefly illustrate the themes, problems,
and concepts developed in the preceding chapters. The
counterweight of an ecocentric politics is a difficult
one for modern thinkers. Their efforts to develop a
political response to the outrages they feel has generally
not been an adequate articulation of the root problem;
instead, they tend to do battle with the surface phenomenon
of environmental destruction.
A response to Fedorov that merely argues against
the technological "fix" would be to confirm his line of
argument, to accept his conceptual framework, and to help
deflect attention from the far more crucial issue already
discussed, the question of what kind of world „e want.
FedoroVs argument proceeds as If the debate were about the
facts themselves, as If It were a question of their truth-
fulness. To ignore the major assumption embedded In this
argument Is to concede that all along there never was any
environmental problem.
The task is to develop a political ecology that
fully comprehends the pathology of homocentrism
. Eco-
centrists never believed that "modernity" or "technology"
were themselves implicated in the problem. Their concerns
imply a full acceptance of such facts, and then move on to
the problems incurred as a result of our condition. The
inadequacy of the efforts made so far is that they do not
serve well in the role of the interrogator of the homo-
centric mind. These efforts should be examined in detail.
Early poli tical ecology
The notion of stages of political ecology derives
less from the order of appearance of a work than from what
it contributes to a conception of a moral politics. As
it approximates an ecocentric outlook, political ecology
is able to make connections between polity and wild nature.
The least well-developed idea for a political
ecology is contained in Ark II: Social Response to Environ-
mental Imperatives by Dennis Pirages and Paul Ehrlich.
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This work pays no attention to the concept of a human na-
ture; instead, it focuses on politics understood as what
governments do. Its characterization as a political ecology
is owed to its view that a fundamental alteration of society
is a necessity. The authors exhibit signs of understanding
that rational-factual argument about environmental hazards
does not persuade, let alone move others to action, but
they are unclear about the prescriptive nature of their
task. Their prologue states their case.
Noah had ample warning from a respected authority tobuildhis Ark, and he used his time to good advantage.Skeptics laughed, ridiculed, and drowned—but Noah
the original prophet of doom, survived. We too havebeen warned that a flood of problems now threatens
the persistence of industrial society, but this time
the ark cannot be built out of wood and caulking.
We must ensure our survival by redesigning the polit-
ical, economic, and social institutions of industrial
society. If a new institutional ark cannot be made
watertight in time, industrial society will sink,
dragging under prophets of doom as well as skeptics
and critics . ' '
All the talk about how we must redesign social
institutions and how we must face other imperatives has
been part of the standard fare environmental writers have
served up. The serious obstacles in the way of realizing
these aims have not stopped the flow of rhetoric. Yet if
these aims were realized—namely, the change in social in-
stitutions, the curbing of some behavior, curbing the worst
abuses of the environment—what really would change? The
goal of a steady state sustainable society would be as far
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away as it ever was. Behavior indicative of a unity of
man and nature, for example, humaneness toward animals,
would still be exceptional.
Ehrlich and Pirages tell us that "... a new
society could be based on development of human character-
istics that are now lacking. "^^ But since they spell out
a vision of social change that does not escape the homo-
centric orbit, their "new" social arrangements are part
of the same bifurcated consciousness they see as perni-
cious. They say "The new society cannot be created with-
out new people to live in it."^^ Who are these new people
and how do we create them? All they tell us is that
Unless we learn to cooperate rather than compete, to
do unto others as we would have done unto ourselves,
to see other people to be like us, and to work for
the good of all mankind rather than just for the good
of a few, little of significance can be accomplished.
Empathy must become a universal quality. People
must identify their fate with the fate of all mankind,
or there will be no way to overcome the global tragedy
of the commons. °^
About these imperatives we are told, always on some pretext,
that terrible problems lie ahead unless we change our be-
havior. None of the many writers who have said this seem
to comprehend the homocentric phenomenon which prevents
recognition that the desired social world is impossible
without a social theory and politics directed at an
ideal construct of self and world. These authors appear
oblivious to the social scheme, its consciousnes s , and
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official assumptions generating a social reality.
With the homocentrisfs denial of wild nature, a
whole realm of possibilities opens up for freedom of action.
Placing only those restrictions on one another which are
prudential in character, homocentrists are free to do any-
thing. "Freedom- and "obligation" are, of course, complex
words that are constructed on layer after layer of histori-
cal ideas. The bifurcation has erased large portions of
such content. One preservationist organization says "save
their world, its your world too ! "—apparent ly not realizing
the irony. Our authors, similarly, appear to be "out to
lunch."
Other statements Ehrlich and Pirages make are
equally incongruous. "Indeed, humanistic faiths, stressing
the unity of all mankind and of human beings with nature,
could be an essential part of a major transformation."^^
Humanistic faiths about the unity of mankind have been
around for a long time and they are quite ineffectual.
Although it is possible to posit a naturalistic humanism
which does not accept a dichotomy between humans and nature,
they do not explain these unities as part of any theory.
The major problem here is that nature is not given any
content. This lack of content leaves the authors without
a theory of how to link the good of nature with the good
of society.
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Ark^ begins with a litany of environmental woes
and ends with a call for social change. Unfortunately
the good of all humankind is not necessarily the good of
the environment taken externally. If social transforma-
tion seems distant, authoritarian techno-bureaucracy seems
all too feasible. Given the environmental concerns of
Ark_II and the observation that the average citizen is
politically incompetent, it follows for Ehrlich and Pirages
that:
Long-range planning in a very complex society will
require a much higher level of competency in politicsGoverning must be transformed into a profession thatis reserved for wise and dedicated individuals ratherthan being allowed to remain an arena where representa-tives of vested interests fight to retain their dis-proportionate share of the rewards. There will belittle room for mistakes in coordinating the affairs
of a densely populated and highly interdependent
society, if that society is to survive future
challenges
.
They neglect to tell us how there could be a wise and
disinterested bureaucracy
, not caught up in factualism,
that would also produce the kind of leaders they call for.
Their notion of social transformation remains philosophi-
cally unsophisticated.
So far the construction of a political ecology
has not moved much beyond the idea that unless we have
more authoritarian forms of government, hopefully by benev-
olent and wise authoritarians, the world will meet an
unhappy fate. Political ecologists have allowed themselves
to be construed this way, as R.D. Holsworth notes in a
critique of this idea.^^ Holsworth argues that political
ecologists such as Paul Ehrlich, Dennis Pirages, Garrett
Hardin, Robert Heilbroner, and William Ophuls
.
.
misunderstand crucial elements of the 'crisis'and Ignore the emancipatory potential within theecological censure of the liberal-capi talis? andstate-socialist politics. The eco-criti? men??onedabove have described with acumen the delete??ois consequences of liberal-capitalism's development? But
our'nn?yf '^r^ ^^^-'^^ ^^^^^^ incapacities ofpolitical organization, their call for an end toliberalism ironically terminates by recycling thesolution of the most distasteful liberal, ThomasHobbes, m the guise of tragic realism. 8^
This reading of the political ecologists is highly selec-
tive. Ehrlich and Pirages manifest a deep ambivalence
about the solution to the environmental problem, although
their prognosis of the problem is that we are faced with
the prospect of a dead end for man. Heilbroner and Ophul
share this ambivalence and prognosis. Holsworth, in con-
trast, is skeptical about the prognosis although he sheds
no further light of the problem.
The terms of crisis and eco-disaster as employed by
political ecologists can also be an obstacle to clear
headed analysis. Whereas their warnings purport to
be based on accurate scientific predictions, they
furnish us only the most minimal details of the
impending crisis.
Stage one of political ecology is founded on the
idea that because we are headed for global disaster we
must ensure our survival by turning government decision
making over to authorities competent to take the right
actions. This leaves it open to a two-pronged attack. On
one side it is all too possible to throw open to question
the whole notion that a disaster is impending. On the
other side, it is an easy task to criticize the solution
that elite managers, autocrats, or authoritarians will
somehow save us, even while we lose our political freedoms.
As long as political ecology is narrowed to these terms
a critique like Holsworth's is inevitable. Holsworth
forgets his remark about "emancipatory potential" and
does not argue much beyond a vaguely worded notion that
"... participatory varients of democracy
. . . preserve
for ourselves ... the significant decisions concerning
the direction of our lives. "^^ If Holsworth had looked
at the social transformation theme in Ark II
,
he would
have noticed the implicit participatory idea that at least
struggles for recognition in this work.
Ehrlich and Pirages' suggestion that a social
transformation would bring about human characteristics
now lacking would be more compelling if it were accompanied
by a critique of present characteristics and a theory of
social change. If social change were linked to a philoso-
phy of nature, the beginnings of an ecocentric political
ecology would emerge.
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Further developments in political ecology
Ecocentrists believe they can have a profound impact
on consciousness by affecting political institutions; they
are ambivalent about the transformative potential of the
average citizen. In Robert Heilbroner's The Human Prospect ,
the average citizen is viewed through the spectacles of
liberal individualism. In this regard, Heilbroner, as a
political ecologist, is hard pressed to show how environ-
mental problems could seem immediate to millions of people
for whom experience is personal pleasure and pain. In every-
day life, talk about the prospect for humankind seems ab-
stract and far away. The quotidian closes off all public
events as outside the domain of experience. People see
their next meal looming larger than all the problems in
China. Heilbroner writes:
... we face the horrendous possibility that humanity
may react to the approach of environmental danger by
indulging in a vast fling while it is still possible
—
a fling entirely justified by the estimation of
present enjoyments over future ones. On what private,
'rational' considerations, after all, should we make
sacrifices now to ease the lot of generations whom
we will never live to see?
There is only one possible answer to this question.
It lies in our capacity to form a collective bond of
identity with those future generations.
Contemporary industrial man, his appetite for the
present whetted by the values of high-consumption
society and his attitude toward the future influenced
by the prevailing canons of self -concern , has but a
limited motivation to form such bonds. °^
Heilbroner wonders whether, in the light of impending
environmental catastrophe, society can be changed from
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its present "calculus of selfishness parading as reason-^S to
one in which the identif icatory sense prevails. This is
the one glimmer of hope in an otherwise despairing view
of industrial man or woman, a view of certain obdurate
human characters tics
. His allegation of "selfishness"
should have been recognized in terms of the context that
legitimizes it. This is the same context in which the
threat of "surgical" nuclear strikes against an imagined
enemy is consigned to the realm of the public event.
If individual selfishness were the problem, then
it would be a question of individual volition, of individ-
uals attempting to rise to a social challenge and failing
to do so because each one was too mean spirited. Homo-
centrism does not exist simply because we have a "self-
indulgent culture" but because each individual is cut off
from virtually everything else.
Because Heilbroner diagnoses our socio-political
problem in terms of the narrow, egocentric individual, he
too falls into the trap of calling for centralized power,
perhaps taken to repressive extremes.
Thus in all likelihood we must brace ourselves
for the consequences of which we have spoken— the
risk of 'wars of redistribution' or of 'preemptive
seizure,' the rise of social tensions in the indus-
trialized nations over the division of an ever more
slow-growing or even diminishing product, and the
prospect of a far more coercive exercise of national
power as the means by which we attempt to bring
these disruptive processes under control.
. . . If then, by the question 'Is there hope
for man?' we ask whether ^^ no -u-.
such hope: 90 ' be: No, there is no
This result is a consequence of his refusing to free him-
self from a Hobbesian diagnosis. His explanation clearly
does not fit all the facts, but is rather a conventional
construct. In particular, there are certain environmen-
talists who do not fit his view. Heilbroner's thesis
would look very different had he taken account of the
bifurcation in consciousness.
As a contribution to the concept of a political
ecology, Heilbroner's statement about our capacity to form
a collective bond of identity with future generations is
invaluable. He falls short, however, in his analysis about
how this collective bond could be formed. Recall that he
says contemporary man "has but a limited motivation to
form such bonds." Clearly, Heilbroner thinks that moti-
vation and intention are to the point. Could such a refor-
mation of the will come about on its own? the answer is
clearly that it cannot. Heilbroner does not see that the
issue is not motivation but transformation through the
concept of a politics of selfhood aiming toward a coopera-
tive, sustainable society.
The political ecologists discussed here all have
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the inclination to imagine a moral politics, but then in
despair turn from this promise to the idea of repressive,
authoritarian rule. Yet the subtleties of dealing with
this idea philosophically are demanding and conceptually
elusive. The interrogations, critiques, and observations
set out in these pages do not themselves form a complete
theory
.
Confronting antienvironmentalism
A view of the problems confronting the development
of a political ecology and a consequent version of self and
world must deal with the widespread ideology of antienviron-
mentalism. Predictions of "environmental catastrophes"
invite a query about what counts as such a catastrophe.
Because a world catastrophe would be a complex event and
all of its dimensions would be impossible to describe in
advance, political ecologists leave themselves open to
two accusations. The first is that they predict a future
catastrophe which has yet to be described. Will such a
catastrophe be the end of civilization as we know it, the
extinction of humanity, or something less far reaching?
Second, H.M. Enzensberger , in his paper "A Critique of
Political Ecology," tells us that the prognostications
of political ecology imply an expertise in many branches
of science, including
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The charge is that political ecologists really cannot say
what the future holds because no one can. Reactions from
both the "right" and the "left" lock political ecologists
into a center position from which the left describes them
as having a class bias, while the right attacks them as
"dooms ters . "
However, no writer has actually offered a cogent
counter analysis to that which Ophuls gives. It is hard
to see how Ophuls' argument can be contravened. He shows
us in the substantive sections of Ecology and the Politics
of Scarcity that all of our technological wizardry will
not be able to feed a world population of eight billion
people. Given the international situation of the present,
a world population of four bi.llion is not being sustained.
Hunger and malnutrition are rampant problems, especially
in the third world countries. Ophuls' lengthy and well
argued attack on runaway population growth invites a
counter attack from the left— the same attack which Paul
Ehrlich incurred at an earlier date. Enzensberger tells
us that these neo-Mal thusian arguments are only the
93propaganda of the ruling classes. In conclusion to
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lengthy argument he quotes a Cuban source. Here is the quote
in fu] 1
:
wi'^f ^P^^^^'' °^ question many times.We recall his words now: 'In certain countries the^
Mnn'?^'^g
that only birth control provides a solu-tion to the problem. Only capitalists, the exploiterscan speak like that; for no one who in conscioSs of
'
what man can achieve with the help of technology andscience will wish to set a limit to the number ofhuman beings who can live on the earth. That isthe deep conviction of all revolutionaries, 'what
characterized Malthus in his time and the neo-Malthu-
sians m our time is their pessimism, their lack oftrust m the future destiny of man. That alone is the
reason why revolutionaries can never be Malthusians.
We shall never be too numerous however many of usthere are, it only we all together place our efforts
and our intelligence at the service of mankind, a
mankind which will be freed from the exploitation
of man by man.'^^ (emphasis added.)
Beyond this socialist rhetoric it remains unclear how
there will be enough room for billions more. Ophuls
analysis goes unanswered. In such a world, every acre
of land will be turned over to improved agriculture. If
present trends such as commercial development continue
in the United States, the bread basket of the world, we
can look forward to mass starvation.
Yet it is only because environmental catastrophe
is stated in physical terms that the poltical ecologists
are replied to in kind. The problem from an ecocentric
perspective is less how to feed an overabundant population
than what kind of culture these populations will develop.
Because consciousness is shaped by conditions in the
world, overcrowding narrows consciousness to survival
133
sur-
G
considerations alone; all else is obliterated. Since
vival conditions alone are already the lot of most peopl
in the third world countries, it is charged that to want
anything else is "elitist" or "imperialistic."
Ecocentric politics can readily acknowledge that
the world's wealth is not equitably distributed, and that
if it were, many of the third world problems would be
alleviated. They can say this and still want to keep wild
nature alive where it remains. The bifurcation is the
central fact that ecocentrists can never forget. If human
survival in the third world is at the expense of wild
nature, it is also the case that in the United States wild
nature is exploited to gain even more wealth. So even if
poverty were ended in the third world we should have no
reason to suppose that its end would bring about the sur-
vival of all species. In fact, the bifurcation of con-
sciousness will always be the sufficient condition for
exploiting wild nature and destroying species.
On the other hand, abandonment of homocentrism is
equivalent to working for equity among peoples. To unify
the consciousness of everyone's needs with the needs of
all living things is to expand consciousness toward all
life. Such equity would then be understood as the support
for everyone's highest aspirations. The ecocentric devel-
opment of consciousness would result in the higher welfare
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of societies within and among
fication of humanity and wild
of humanity.
themselves because its reuni-
nature represents the welfare
Conclusion
The political ecologists discussed in this work
have launched a social critique in which they raised issues
about our destruction of the environment. Complaining that
certain human attitudes are responsible for our plight,
Ophuls in particular has come close to saying that some-
thing more than just superficial social change is necessary
He insists that a "genuine morality" must arise, although
he does not describe this morality. All four political
ecologists strongly urge a new morality as the way out of
our environmental predicament. Even Heilbroner's cynical
stance is counterbalanced by the hope that a "survivalist
ethic will come to the fore." Yet such vague hopes are
dismally far from reflecting a genuine understanding of
the practice of environmental morality.
The relational quality of an ecocentric morality
derives partly from attempting to grasp true membership
in a community of humanity and nature. It cannot, however,
be derived from historical theory. For though a version
of the relational self is found in Aristotle, there has
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m
been little temporal experience of the relational self i
western cultures. How can we account, then, for the appear-
ance of an Ideal of ecocentrlsm occurlng In a society of
homocentric outlook?
Intimations of the Geocentric view now appear as
a reaction to the extreme banality of contemporary culture.
Though ecocentrism is impossible to understand from the
homocentric point of view, it does, nonetheless, provide
the only genuine alternative to instrumental relativism.
But this assertion forces us to pose the question: can
ecocentric consciousness survive, or will homocentrism
nullify its project and thereby the mind which belongs
to it?
The project is the multidimensional effort to
reconsider our modes of inquiry, our approach to know-
ledge and moral reasoning. Ecocentrism is a revision of
thought and action. The theory of a political ecology
is the medium for this revisionary work. To realize a
certain vision of the world is to understand the epistemic
project. It is clear beyond doubt that the present modes
of social consciousness will lead to the extermination of
most nonhuman life, to an overcrowded planet, to the
ultimate reduction of the human self in its object form,
to an organism at war with most others of its kind, to
an existence reduced to its most basic forms, aiming
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at .ere survival. m these pages the confrontation with
this consciousness produced a set of problems showing
that such a future can only be a failure of the human
promise and potential. It follows that if humanity does
physically survive in this mode of consciousness, it will
be a survival that is perhaps not worth the effort.
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